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Where Credit Is Due: Advantages of 
the Credit-Invoice Method for a 
Partial Replacement VAT 
ITAI GRINBERG' 
L TN'I' HODUCTION 
The value-added tax ("VAT") is a mainstay of fiscal systems in over 
130 countries around the wo rld, including every O rgan isation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development ("GECD") country except the 
United States. l Although the re are two major alternat ive methods for 
calculating VAT liability-the "credit-invoice method" and the "sub-
traction method"-existing nationa l-level VATs are implemented al-
most exclusively using the credit- invoice method.2 Japa n is the only 
developed economy that utilizes some subtraction-method fea tures to 
impose a VAT.3 
Numerous prio r papers have analyzed credit-invoice method and 
subt raction-method VATs. This Arl icle draws on thaI literature 10 fo-
cus on some of the simi laril ies and d ifferences between these two 
methods fo r ca lculating VAT li abi lity. In the United States, some 
prominent tax reform proposals have involved variants of the subt rac-
tion-method VAT that are intended to make the tax more progressive 
and potentia ll y more appropriate as a replacemenl for the entire in-
come tax.4 By contrast, this Article focuses on questions that would 
• AttorneY-Advisor, Or£ice of Tax Policy. U.S. Treasury Department. The views 
expressed here are my own and are not intended in any way to represent the views o f the 
U.S. Treasury Department. I would like to thank Reuven Avi-Yonah, Jesse Eggert, 
Michael Graetz, Charles McLure, Jr. , Michael Plowgian, and Emil Sun ley for generously 
laking Ihe time 10 read and comment on earlier drafts of this paper. Any errors or 
omissions are my own. 
I See Jeffrey Owens, Fundamental Tax Reform: An International Perspective, 59 Nat '! 
Tax J. 131 (2006) (providing detailed discussion of revenue sources in DECO countries). 
2 A third method for calculating VAT liabil ity, the Haddition method," has never been 
adopted as a national tax in any jurisdiction. See nOte 117 and accompanying text. 
3 See notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
4 Various consumption tax proposa ls have received attention in academic and polit ical 
ci rcles, In addi tion to credi t-invoice method and subtraction-method VATs, among the 
most well-known proposals are the Flat Tax, popularized by presidential candidate Steve 
Forbes, and the X-Tax, a progressive rate variation developed by the la te David Bradford 
that uses the same structure as the Flat Tax. Sec David Bradford, Fundamental Issues in 
Consumption Taxation (1996); David F. Bradford, 1be X-Tu in the World Economy 
(NBER. Working Paper No. WI0676, 2004), available at htlp:/lwww.nber.orglpapersl 
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arise if an unmodified subtraction·method VAT or a credit~invoice 
method VAT were chosen to supplement or replace some portion of 
the revenue from the income tax. 
Part I describes the basic mechanics of a credit-invoice method 
VAT and a subtraction-method VAT. Credit-invoice method VATs 
calculate VAT due by multiplying the value of taxable sa les by the 
relevant tax rate and subtracting VAT paid on inputs from the tenta-
tive tax due on sales. Subtraction-method VATs subtract the amount 
paid for inputs from taxable sales and multiply by the relevant tax 
rate. The key perceived difference between the credit-invoice method 
VAT and the subtraction-method VAT is that the former is generally 
conceived as a tax on specific transactions, whereas the latter is gener-
ally thought to be a tax on an entity. The key substantive difference 
between most subtraction-method VAT proposals and extant credit-
invoice method VATs is that subtraction-method VAT proposals gen-
erally do not impose an invoice requirement. An invoice requirement 
achieves two ends: It limits the VAT credits provided for tax paid 
with respect to inputs purchased by entities subject to the VAT ("reg-
iste red traders") to purchases from other registe red traders, and il en-
sures that the VAT credit obtained by the purchaser is equal to the 
VAT paid on the input. Borrowing from Charles McLure and David 
Weisbach's work and nomenclature, Part II categorizes subtraction-
method VATs that provide registered traders a deduction for all input 
purchases as "open" subtraction-method VATs, and subtraction-
method VATs that would strictly limit deductions to purchases from 
other registered traders as "sophisticated" subtraction-method VATs. 
Most well-known U.S. subtraction-method VAT proposals are not so-
phisticated subtraction-method VATs. 
Part III considers how choosing the credit-invoice method VAT, the 
open subtraction-method VAT, or the sophisticated subtraction-
method VAT may affect VAT administration and design and, con-
versely, how choices regarding desired administrative and design fea-
tures may dictate which method is preferable . These design features 
include whether to exempt certain supplies of goods or services by 
certain entities from the VAT, whether to tax supplies of some goods 
or services at lower rates, the taxation of nonprofit organizations, 
Slate and local government, real estate, financial services, and small 
w10676.pdf (hereinafter X-Tax]; Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka. The Flat Tax (2d ed. 
1995). The Flat Tax and the X·Tax both modify a "subuaction-method" VAT in order to 
collect the portion of value added to a product anributable to labor at the individual level. 
Using a graduated ra te structure to tax value added attributable to labor makes the distri-
bution of the burden of a VAT more progressive. Although extensively discussed in the 
U.S. fund amental lax reform debate, such modified subtraction-method VAT proposals 
generally are beyond the scope of Ihis Article. 
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business, and, importantly. how to treat imports, exports, and " Josses" 
(nega tive taxable value-added). Part III identifies VAT best practices 
for each design feature and evaluates the capacity of a VAT to adopt 
those best practices with or without an invoice requirement, as well as 
the potential effect of using a credit-invoice or subtraction-method ap-
proach. Many of the relevant design issues 3re specifically addressed 
in other Articles for this conference. Where those Articles offer spe-
cific design recommendations based on the literature and interna-
tional experience, Part II] trea ts those recommendations as best 
practice. 
Part III illustrates that the Jack of symmetry between deductions 
and inclusions in an open subtraction-method VAT leaves such a sys-
tem susceptible 10 significant tax avoidance. That same asymmetry 
also invites lobbying for inappropriate exemptions by providers of 
specific inte rmediate inputs to other businesses. In contrast , neither a 
sophisticated subtraction-method VAT nor a credit-invoice method 
VAT raise this and other concerns that result from a lack of symmetry 
between deductions and inclusions. The literature suggests that the 
perception of a subtraction-method VAT as an "entity-based" tax, 
however, may make exemptions of specific goods and services less 
likely than in a credit-invoice method VAT, and for the same reason 
may make entity-based exemptions more likely than in a credi t-in-
voice method VAT. The recommendations provided by other authors 
at this conference with respect to the appropriate treatment of se r-
vices provided by nonprofit organizations and state and local govern-
ment, residential housing, and financial services suggest that in these 
areas narrowly tailored exemptions and zero-rating can be appropri-
ate, while broad-based entity-level exemptions are less desirable. A 
credit-invoice method VAT thus may be preferable to a subtraction-
method VAT, as it seems better suited to appropriately address these 
Issues. 
Part III also observes that a credit-invoice method VAT could easily 
interact wi th other consumption tax systems around the world 
and comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules without sac-
rificing VAT design features that allow for effective enforcement. In 
contrast , following the standard neutrality and enforcement-enabling 
practice of destination-basis taxation (as opposed to origin-basis taxa-
tion) with respect to imports and exports could raise WTO complica-
tions in a subtraction-method VAT. Further, the taxation of cross-
border services may also be more easi ly coordinated with other VAT 
systems around the world under a credit-invoice method VAT than 
under a subtraction-method VAT. A credit-invoice method VAT 
would also provide more scope for coordination with state-level retail 
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sales taxes than a subtraction-method VAT. Finally. political economy 
concerns may suggest that consumption tax best practices are more 
sustainable in a credit-invoice VAT than in a subtraction-method VAT 
intended to partially replace or supplement the corporate and individ-
ual income taxes. 
Part IV considers the implications of David Weisbach 's demonstra-
tion that purported substantive differences between the subtraction-
method VAT and the credit-invoice method VAT are not inherent to 
the two methods of calculation. Weisbach's analysis shows that a so-
phisticated subtraction-method VAT that went further and adopted a 
full invoice requirement in principle could import all potential fea-
tures of a credit-invoice method VAT, including multiple rates. Part 
IV concludes that while plausible in principle, there is little impetus 
for adopting such a tax, at least outside the context of progressive con-
sumption taxes. A subtraction-method VAT with a full invoice re-
quirement and multiple rates would lack the simplicity and familiarity 
that advocates of subtraction-method VATs point to when recom-
mending the subtraction-method VAT. The Article concludes that if a 
partial replacement VAT were to be adopted by the United States, it 
would likely be best-implemented through the credit-invoice method. 
The open subtraction-method VAT faces revenue leaks and has signif-
icant problems of administration and enforcement. Extant U.S. sub-
traction-method VAT proposals are generally at least partially open 
subtraction-method VATs. While a sophisticated subtraction-method 
VAT might not be flawed in the same ways as an open subtraction-
method VAT, VAT design best practices are more readily adopted in 
the context of a credit-invoice method VAT. 
II. OVEHVlEW OF VALUE-ADDED TAXES 
A variety of structures can be used to tax the value of goods and 
services consumed by taxpayers. Tn the United States, the most famil-
iar consumption tax is the retail sales tax ("RST") used by most of the 
states. A conceptually pure RST would be imposed whenever a 
household purchased any good or service for the purpose of consump-
tion. "Real -world" RSTs, however, most often are imposed on a rela-
tively narrow group of goods and services and are prone to evasion.s 
RSTs also tend to "cascade," which is to say that some goods are 
double-taxed because businesses pay RST on goods or services they 
S For discussions of tbe narrOwness of RST bases and their susceptibility to evasion, see 
Charles E. McLure, Jr., The U.S. Debate on Consumption-Based Taxes: Implications for 
the Americas, 29 U. Miami Inter-A m. L. Rev. 143, 148-49 (1997); John L. Mikesell, A 
Quality Index for State Sales Tax Structure-Measuring the States Against an Ideal Stan-
dard, 35 SI. Tax Notes 129 (Jan. 10, 2005). 
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purchase as inputs for their business processes, and the n those inputs 
are taxed a second time as part of the sale of the final good or service.6 
The VAT is conceptually similar to an RST, but is imposed via a 
mechanism that involves every stage of production and distribution. 
Relative to an RST, most analysts conclude that a VAT reduces eva-
sion, improves enforcement, is more likely to be imposed on a broader 
tax base, and systematically avoids the "cascading" problem.1 
A. Credit-Invoice Melhod VAT 
In a credit-invoice method VAT, registered businesses ("registered 
traders") assess tax on taxable goods and se rvices each time they sup-
ply such a good or service to either a business or a consumer.8 Regis-
tered traders then are permitted to reduce the amount of VAT they 
are liable to remit to the government by a credit equal to the amount 
of VAT paid to other registered traders in purchasing business inputs 
(intermediate goods, services, fuel, plant and equipment, and the 
Like). The credit eliminates the VAT on goods and services used by a 
registered trader, but leaves in place the VAT on sales to final con-
sumers.9 This mechanism ensures that the consumption of all goods 
and services subject to the VAT will be taxed once, but only once, 
generally at the consumer leve l. 
The amount of VAT credit available to a registered trader to offset 
VAT liability is determined based on printed invoices received by a 
purchasing registered trader from a selling registered trader (referred 
to herein as the " invoice requirement"). These invoices detail the 
amount of VAT collected on a given sale, and the VAT registration 
numbers of the buyer and seller. The invoice requirement makes the 
VAT partially self-policing because registe red traders demand in-
voices in order to claim the input credits that reduce their own VAT 
liability. While the claim that the VAT is self-enforcing may be over-
6 See, e.g., Robert Cline, John L. Mikesell , Thomas S. Neubig & Andrew Phillips, Sales 
TaxaliOIl of Business Inputs: Exist illg Tax DislOrtiolls and the Consequences of Extending 
the Sales Tax to Business Services, 35 St. Tax Notes 457, 465·66 (Feb. 14,2005). 
7 See, e.g., Sijbren Cnossen, Evaluating the National Retail Sales Tax from a VAT Per· 
spective, in United Slates Tax Reform in the 21st Century 215 (George R. Zodrow & Peter 
Mieszkowski cds., 2002); John L. Mikesell, The American Retail Sales Tax: Considerations 
on Their Structure, Operations, and Potential as a Foundation for a Federal Sales Tax, 50 
Nat'l Tax J. 149 (1997); George K. Yin. DUnwody Distinguished lecture in l aw, Is the Tax 
System Beyond Reform?, 58 Fla. l. Rev. 977, 1006-11 (2006); George R. Zodrow, The 
Sa les Tax, the VAT, and Taxes in Between-or, Is the Only Good NRST a "VAT in 
Drag"?, 52 Nat'l Tax J. 429 (1999). 
8 Although some VAT regimes recognize a legal distinction between the terms "sale" 
and "supply," they are used interchangeably in th is Article. 
9 See Cnossen, note 7, at 215-17; Mikesell , note 7, at 151-52; Yin, note 7, at 1006·10; 
Zodrow, note 7, at 43\. 
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Slaled, when subsequently used to claim an input credit, VAT invoices 
create a paper trail that gives tax authorities an independent source of 
information about the selling firm's sales, and thus can belp the tax 
authorities enforce the VAT. The prospect of this type of third-party 
information reporting may induce businesses to comply more fully 
with the law. The VAT invoice chain also may provide a useful tool in 
the enforcement of business income taxes. 
After applying input credits, a registered trader's final VAT liability 
is equivalent to a tax on the "value added" by that business- defined 
as the sales price of the outputs of the business less the purchase price 
of its nonlabor inputs previously subject to VAT. In a well~function­
ing VAT, a registered trader with more input credits than VAT liabil-
ity (for example, an exporter or a firm that makes a large capital 
investment) can obtain a refund for VAT paid in excess of input 
credits. 
The following example illustrates how the credit-invoice method 
VAT collects the same amount of tax as an ideal RST. A winemaker 
buys grapes from a grape grower and uses them to produce a case of 
wine for sale to retailers. The winemaker buys grapes and other sup-
plies from the grape grower at a cost of $30 per case of wine before 
tax . The winemaker sells each case of wine for $70 before tax. The 
retailer sells a case of wine for $100 before lax. In an ideal RST, only 
the sale by the retailer to consumers would be taxed. If the RST rate 
were 20% , $20 of tax would be collected by the retailer on the sale of 
a $100 case of wine to a final consumer and remitted to the 
government.10 
A 20% VAT added to each transaction in the production and distri -
bution process collects the same amount of revenue as a noncascading 
RST (charged only to final consumers). Because the VAT is charged 
on all sa les of taxable goods and se rvices ("taxable supplies"), the 
grape grower collects 20% VAT on her sa les of grapes, charging the 
winemaker $6 of tax on each $30 of sales. The grape grower remits 
the $6 of VAT to the government. The winemaker charges the retailer 
$84 ($70 + $14 of VAT) per case of wine. Instead of sending all $14 of 
VAT to the government, however, the winemaker subtracts the $6 of 
VAT paid by the winemaker to the grape grower from the $14 col-
lected in VAT, and remits $8 to the government per case of wine sold. 
Similarly, instead of remitting $20 per case of wine sold to the govern-
ment , the retailer subtracts the $14 of VAT paid by the retailer to the 
winemaker from the $20 collected in VAT from the consumer, and 
10 RSTs tend 10 cascade, and thereby deviate from Ihe ideal, because the law does nOI 
always distinguish between, for eumple. sales of wine to an individual for personal con-
sumption and sales of wine to a restaurant for resale. 
2010J WHERE CREDIT IS DUE 315 
remits $6 to the government per case of wine sold. The tax authority 
receives $20 in total-$6 from the grape grower, $8 from the 
winemaker, and $6 from the retailer. The VAT and the RST collect 
equivalent amounts of revenue, and from the consumer's perspective 
the taxes look identical. l ] 
EXA.MPLE I 
Grape 
Grower Winemaker Retailer Total 
Basic Transactions 
Pretax sales $30 $70 $100 
Pretax purchases 0 30 70 
Value added (sales · purchases) 30 40 30 $100 
Credit-Invoice Method VAT 
Tax on sales (20% of line 1) 6 14 20 
Less: input tax on purchases 0 6 14 
Net VAT liability 6 8 6 20 
Rerail Sales Tax 
Tax on sales (20% of line 1) Exempt Exempt $ 20 $ 20 
Credit-invoice method VAT liability generally is calculated from ac-
counts for a taxable period (generally monthly, bimonthly, or quar-
terly). Aggregate input tax paid is subtracted from aggregate tax 
liability on all taxable sales for the taxable period. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the credit-invoice method VAT is often referred to as a 
"transaction-based" tax (because conceptually the tax is assessed on 
each individual transaction subject to the VAT), VAT liability and 
VAT credits are not matched for each individual item sold. A more 
precise description is that the credit-invoice method VAT is a "trans-
actions-based, accounts-verified" tax, because while the tax is assessed 
on each individual transaction, tax remittance to the tax authority is 
calculated and audited based on accounts. 12 
11 like an RST, consumers can be shown credit-invoice method VAT liability for their 
purchases on printed receipts, Ihereby making the tax "visible." See, e.g., Repon of the 
President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair & Pro·Growth: Proposals 
to Fix America's Tal[ System 204 (Nov. 2005) [hereinafter Tax Reform Panel Report), 
available at http://permanenl.access.gpo.gov/lps64969rraI[Reformwholedoc. pdf. Stating 
Ihe VAT separately is nOI only possible, but also more consistent with the invoice 
requirement. 
12 See Sijbren Cnossen, VAT Coordination in Common Markets and Federations: les-
sons from the European El[perience, 63 Tal[ L. Rev. 583 (2010). An audilor, for example, 
may request invoices 10 suppon particular input credits, and cross-check a sample of those 
invoices. 
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B. Subtraction-Method VAT 
The general design features of a subtraction-method VAT -some-
times referred to as a "business transfer tax"-are somewhat less well 
specified than those of a credit-invoice method VAT. This is largely 
because few taxes characterized as subtraction-method VATs have ex-
isted in practice. Analysts, however, consistently distinguish a sub-
traction-method VAT from a credit-method VAT by noting that a 
subtraction-method VAT does not use credits and that tax due is not 
calculated by subtracting tax paid from gross tax liability.J3 Instead, 
registered traders subtract the value of their total nonlabor inputs 
from the total value of their sales and then multiply by the VAT rate 
to determine their tax liability.14 As a result , the subtraction method 
is described as being "accounts-based," rather than "transactions-
based," ls and is commonly perceived to be a tax on an entity.16 In 
contrast, the credit-invoice method tax is commonly understood to be 
a tax on specific goods and services.17 
13 Although there is almost uniform agreement on this point, many analysts also de-
scribe the Japanese VAT as a sUbtraction-method tax. See, e.g., Bruce BartleH, Support 
the VAT, Oct. 23, 2009, available at http:/{forbes.comJ2009Il0J22frepublicans-value-added-
tax-opinions-columnists-bruce-bartlell .hlml; Paul L.E. Grieco & Gary C. Hufbauer, 
America Badly Needs a Value-Added Tax, Fin. limes, Apr. 21, 2005, al 15. Alan Schenk 
and Oliver Oldman more accurately describe the Japanese VAT as a "credit-subtraction" 
VAT, as opposed to Ihe "sales-subtraction VAT" discussed in Ihis Article. See Alan 
Schenk & Oliver Oldman, Value-added Tax: A Comparative Approach 42 (2007). Under 
the Japanese VAT, gross tax on taxable sales is calculated in the same way as in the credit-
invoice method VAT. The mOSI important "subtraction" feature of the Japanese VAT is 
that taxpayers are allowed 10 subtract from their VAT liability an amount of input credit 
that is calculated from aggregate accounts, based on total purchases from domestic entities, 
instead of subtracting the amounl of tax paid on each individual transaction with a regis-
lered trader, as shown on credit·invoice method VAT invoices. The Japanese have gradu· 
ally reformed their VAT since it was first imposed, and Ihe reforms have adopted 
enforcement features that make the tax more akin to a credit·invoice method VAT. For 
more on the Japanese consumption tax, see nOles 134-37, and accompanying text; see also 
Schenk & Oldman, supra, at 67-69; Alan Schenk, Japanese Consumption Tax After Si)( 
Years: A Unique VAT Matures, 69 Tax Notes 899 (Nov. 13, 1995). 
\4 Schenk and Oldman describe this method of VAT calculation more precisely as a 
"sales-subtraclion method," to distinguish il from Ihe Japanese VAT. Schenk & Oldman, 
note 13, at 42. 
IS ViCioria P. Summers, The Border Adjustability of Consumption Taxes, Existing and 
Proposed, 12 Tax Notes Int'l 1793, 1796 (June 3, 1996). David Weisbach points outlhat, 
like subtraclion-method VATs, credit-invoice method VATs aggregate Iransactions over 
some period into a single return, so that both forms of VAT are based on transactions and 
bolh are periodic. David A. Weisbach, Fundamenlal Tax Reform: Does the X-Tax Mark 
the Spot?, 56 SMU L Rev. 201, 215 (2003). While this observation is correct, it is equally 
nue that sales ta)(es imposed by the U.S. states are aggregated into a Single return and 
imposed periodically. Nevertheless, sales taxes are perceived as taxes on specific 
transactions. 
16 See Liam Ebrill, Michael Keen , Jean-Paul Bodin & Victoria Summers, The Modern 
VAT 21 (2001). 
17 Id.; Grieco & Hufbauer, note 13, at 15: 
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Michael Graetz observes that , to its proponents, "a subtraction-
method VAT ... has the political virtue of looking more like a corpo-
rate income tax , and it does not show up as a separate charge to con-
sumers."18 One consequence is that U.S. subtraction-method VAT 
proposals, in contrast to credit-invoice method VAT proposals, gener-
ally are proposed to fully replace the corporate income tax,I 9 In addi-
tion to viewing the subtraction method as the simplest way to 
calculate VAT liability, proponents choose the subtraction-method 
VAT because they believe it "demonstrate[s] that the tax is a business 
tax," is more familiar to U.S. businesses, avoids complicating the ad-
ministration of state and local sa les taxes, and is less prone to imposi-
tion at multiple rates on different goods.20 
Credit-invoice method VAT rates, like sales tax rates, are generally 
thought of on a tax-exclusive basis. In contrast, because a subtraction-
method VAT is perceived to be a tax on an entity, subtraction-method 
VAT rates, like income tax rates, are generally thought of on a tax-
inclusive basis. [f a good costs $100 and bears an additional $20 of tax , 
the tax-exclusive rate is 20%. The tax inclusive-rate is 16.6%: $20 
(the tax paid) divided by $120 (the total amount of receipts on taxable 
sales). Tax-exclusive and tax-inclusive rates are both appropriate 
ways of thinking about tax rates. For ease of comparison, however, 
this Article generally uses tax-exclusive rates, whether discussing 
credit-invoice method VATs or subtraction-method VATs. 
Example 2 illustrates how a subtraction-method VAT is calculated, 
using the same facts as in Example 1, with each registered trader sub-
tracting the value of its pretax nonlabor inputs from the total value of 
its pretax sales, and applying a flat 20% tax rate to the difference. As 
in Example 1, Example 2 assumes that the grape grower, the 
winemaker, and the retailer are all registered traders. 
The credit-invoice method used in Europe assesses VAT on each transaction, 
but allows a credit for VAT paid by companies on their purchase of intermedi· 
ate goods. This requires a chain of invoices and results in a system that looks 
similar to a sales or turnover tax. Under the subtraction method, used in Ja-
pan, companies pay VAT on their value added. calculated as the difference 
between final sales and purchases of intermediate goods. Administratively. 
this system closely resembles the corporate income tax~and is beller suited to 
the U.S. 
L8 Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Simple, Fair, and Competi-
tive Tax Plan for the United States 78 (2008). 
19 Set: note 33. Complications that result from repealing the corporate income tax while 
retaining the individual income tax, such as the incent ives for individuals to accumulate 
passive investment income in the corporate form to defer or avoid paying individual inves-
tor-level taxes on such income, are beyond the scope of this Article. 
20 Gary Clyde Hulbauer & Paul L.E. Grieco. Reforming The US Corporate Tax 70-71 
(2005); Eight Memorandums on Provisions in the Danforth/Borcn "Comprehensive Tax 
Restructuring and Simplification Act of 1994," (May 26, 1994), 94 TNT 103-27, May 27, 
1994 , available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File. 
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EXM1PLE 2 
Grape 
Grower Winemaker Retailer Total 
Basic Transactions 
Pretax sales $30 $70 $\00 
Pretax purchases 0 30 70 
Value added (sales + purchases) 30 40 30 $UlO 
Subtraction-Method VAT 
VAT liability (20% of line 3) 6 8 6 20 
In this exampLe, the subtraction-method VAT collects the same reve-
nue as the credit-invoice method VAT-in total and at each stage in 
the production-distribution process. This result makes sense concep-
tually. In principle, the credit-invoice method and subtraction-
method VAT are nearly identical taxes. Both are multistage consump-
tion taxes applied on all businesses whether they sell goods to 'the con-
sumer (final point of sale) or to other businesses (intermediate stages 
of production and distribution), but with a credit or deduction to off-
set the tax burden imposed on an intermediate stage producer or dis-
tributor.21 Conceptually either a credit or a deduction can provide an 
equivalent offset against taxes due for taxes paid. The tax value of 
subtracting purchased inputs from the tax base is arithmetically identi-
cal to a credit for all previous VAT paid, assuming VAT is paid at the 
same tax rate on all those inputs. 
The interchangeability of credits and deductions led David Weis-
bach to posit that any perceived differences between credit-invoice 
method and subtraction-method VATs-such as the availability of de-
ductions for the cost of inputs purchased from nonregistered traders 
in the subtraction-method or the credit-invoice method 's flexibility to 
impose preferential tax rates on specific goods or services-are based 
on the amount of information that analysts assume will be collected 
and used to administer credit-invoice method and subtraction-method 
VAT systems, respectively, rather than being inherent in the method 
of calculation.22 Instead of classifying VATs as credit-invoice method 
VATs or subtraction-method VATs, Weisbach divides VATs into three 
categories based on the amount of information the seller of an input 
provides to the buyer of an input andlor the tax administration.23 The 
first category, described by Charles McLure as a "narve" VAT,24 and 
21 See Jack. M. Mintz, The Business Transfer Tax as a Consumption Tax, 10 Tax NOles 
Int'l 75, 75 (Jan. 2, 1995). 
n Weisbach, note 15, at 203. 
23 Id. al 214-15. 
24 Charles E. McLure, Jr. , The Value-Added Tax: Key 10 Deficit Reduction? 71-79 
(\987). 
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later by Weisbach as an "ope n system,"2S allows buyers to deduct the 
cost of inputs regardless of whether a registe red trader supplies them 
and therefore collects VAT on the supply.2(i This Article refers to sub~ 
traction-method VATs of this type as "open subtraction-method 
VATs." The second category Weisbach describes is a "closed" tax that 
collects and uses information about whether a supplier of an input is 
or is not a registered trade rP McLure has labeled a subtraction-
method VAT that would limit buyers to deductions for the costs of 
inputs supplied by registered traders as a "sophisticated" subtraction-
method VAT.28 This Article uses that term. Finally, Weisbach de-
scribes a third category of VAT that collects not only the information 
to verify whether a supplier is a registered trader, but also information 
about the exact amount of tax paid by the supplier with respect to the 
sale of the input , for example, the tax detail for each transaction.29 
Standard credit-invoice method VATs fall into Weisbach's thi rd cate-
gory because of their invoice requirement. 
C. The Lack of un Invoice Requirement ill 
Subtractioll-Method VAT Proposals 
The key substantive difference between subtraction-method VAT 
proposals and extant credit-invoice method VATs is that the former 
generally do not impose an invoice require ment.3o Many analysts 
view the lack of an invoice requirement, and even the lack of verifica-
tion as to whether a supplier is a registe red trader, as essential charac-
teristics of a subtraction-method VAT.31 The lack of an invoice 
requirement may seem natural because a subtraction-me thod VAT 
subtracts the cost of inputs, so that VAT paid may not seem relevant 
to the determination of tax liability. The lack of an invoice require-
ment is a feature of most subtraction-method type VATs proposed for 
the United States.32 
25 David A. Weisbach, Ironing out the Flat Tax, 52 Stan . L. Rev. 599, 613-14 (2000). 
26 Weisbach, note 15, a t 21 4-15, 
21 Id. at 215 (describing the substantive difference between a credit-invoice method 
VAT and a sophisticated subtraction-method VAT 10 be that under the credit-invoice 
method, a seller must record Ihe amount of tax paid, rather than simply certi fying whether 
the transaction is subject to lax); see McLure, note 24, at 79. 
M McLure, note 24, at 71, 76. 
Z9 Weisbach. nOle 15, al 215. 
3D Weisbach, note 25, at 6ll. 
31 Sce, e.g. , Gen. Accounting Office, Tax-Credit and Subtraction Methods of Calcu lating 
a Value-Added Tax, GAO/GGO-89-87, at 13 (1989), available at http://archive.gao.govf 
d25t7/138940.pdf (describing the absence of an invoice requirement as the essential charac-
teristic of a subtraction-method VAT). 
32 See McLure, note 24, at 71, 78·79; Alan Schenk, Value Added Tax: A Model Statute 
and Commentary, A Report of the Committee on Value Added Tax of the American Bar 
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For example, perhaps the best~known pure subtraction-method 
VAT proposals introduced in the U.S. Congress are Senators Boren 
and Danforth 's Comprehensive Tax Restructuring and Simplification 
Act of 1994,33 and Congressman Sam Gibbons' Revenue Restructur-
ing Act of 1996.l4 Those subtraction-method VAT proposals did not 
impose an invoice requirement.35 Other well-known consumption tax 
proposals in the United States (for example, the Flat Tax popularized 
by Steve Forbes36) utilize a modified subtraction-method VAT struc-
ture to impose the VAT at progressive rates. Although these tax 
structures are generally beyond the scope of this Article, it should be 
noted that these proposals also generally do not include an invoice 
requirement.37 
The Japanese VAT, which uses some subtraction-method and some 
credit-method features in its method of calculation,38 does not incor-
porate an invoice requirement, but does limit the deductions available 
to registered traders when calculating VAT liability to those purchases 
made from other domestic entities. 39 Somewhat simjlarly, the Gib-
bons proposal imposed a tax on the amount by which the gross re-
ceipts of a taxable person from business activities exceeded the 
Association Section of Taxation 3-4 (1989). One notable exception is the progressive sub-
traction-method tax proposed by the 2005 Tax Reform Panel. Their report provided tha t 
the "Growth and Investment Tax Plall, although implemented using the subtraction 
method, would similar ly requi re that deductible purchases be allowed only from businesses 
that are subject to the tax, and that these purchases be substantiated." Tax Reform Panel 
Report , note 11. at 163. A recent pure subtraction-method VAT proposal for the United 
Sta tes. the "corporate activity tax" proposed by Gary Hufbauer and Paul Grieco, also pro-
vides that deductions will be ava ilable only from other registered traders. Hufbauer & 
Grieco, note 20, at 70-7 1. 
33 Senators Boren and Danforth proposed a 14.5% subtraction-method VAT to replace 
the corporate income tax, the individual income tax on undistributed profits of pass-
through entities, and one-half of the Social Security tax. S. 2160, J03d Congo (1994), 140 
Congo Rec. 56, 524 (dai ly ed. June 7, 1994); see also John C. Danforth & David L. Boren, 
The Comprehensive Tax Restructuring and Simplification Act of 1994: Technical Over-
view (May 26, 1994),94 TNT 103-26, May 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File; 
Cliff Massa III, "The Business Activities Tax"-A Primer, 64 TaX" Notes 1219, 1222, 1227 
(Aug. 29, 1994). 
34 Gibbons proposed a 20% subtraction-method VAT to replace all federal income taxes 
and Social Security and Medicare employment taxes. A rebate of VAT to low-income 
individuals and a "burden assessment" on high·income individuals were meant to keep the 
proposal distributionally neutral. H.R. 4050, l04th Congo (1996). 
35 An earlier proposal made by Congressman Richard Schulze also did not impose an 
invoice requirement, but did deny deductions for payments made to certain domestic enti· 
ties that were exempt from the subtraction-melhod VAT proposed by the bill. H.R.3170, 
102d Congo (1991). 
36 Steve Forbes, Flat Tax Revolution: Using a Postcard to Abolish the IRS (2OOS). 
37 Many subtraction-method VAT proposals simply do not address the question of 
whether to incorporate an invoice requirement. 
)8 See nOies 13-14. 
39 Japanese Ministry of Fin., Comprehensive Handbook of Japanese Taxes 2(1()6, at 173 
(2006), available at hup:/lwww.mof.go.;p/englishltaxltaxes2006e_e.pdf. 
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business purchases of such person for the taxable period, and defined 
the term business purchase to exclude any amount paid or incurred 
for the import of property or services.40 The Boren·Danforth propo-
sa l reaches the same result by taxi ng the import of property or ser-
vices into the United States and then providing a deduction for 
purchases of imports by registered traders.41 
Thus, the Japanese VAT and the Gibbons and Boren-Danforth pro-
posals are all sophisticated systems internationally, but remain open 
subtraction-method VATs domestically .42 They are not sophisticated 
subtraction-method VATs because they allow purchases from domes-
tic entities that are not registered traders to be deducted. In this re-
gard, a 2007 Japanese national tax reform commission concluded that 
full adoption of the credit-invoice method would improve the reliabil-
ity and transparency ofthe Japanese VAT, but expressed concerns re-
garding the consequence of such re form for preferences provided to 
small businesses under Japan 's current system.43 
Closing the system internationally is an exception t~ the general 
availability of deductions in the Gibbons and Boren-Danforth propos-
als. The Gibbons and Boren-Danforth proposals are closed inte rna-
tionally as part of an effort to achieve destination-basis taxation for 
the subtraction-method VAT. VATs can be imposed on either a desti-
nation basis or an origin basis.44 A destination-basis tax excludes ex-
ports from the tax base and includes imports in the tax base. An 
origin-basis tax includes exports in the tax base and excludes imports 
from the tax base. Credit-invoice method VATs generally are im-
posed on a destination basis. Thus domestic consumption is taxed re-
gardless of where the goods being consumed are produced. If a 
subtraction-method VAT were imposed on the origin basis, foreign -
produced goods and services would not be subject to the VAT on the 
portion of value added abroad when consumed in the United States, 
while U.S.-produced goods and services would continue to be subject 
.II) H.R. 4050, no te 34, § 201. 
~l S. 2160, note 33, § 301. 
42 See Weisbach, note 25, at 615 . 
• ) Tax Comm'n, Japanese Minislry of Fin., Basic Idea for Fundamental Reform of Tax 
System 28 (2007), avai lable at htlp:/(www.mof.go.jpJenglish/taxleQ71Ia.pdf: see also note 
136 and accompanying text. 
-44 For helpful discussions of the international implications of consumption tax proposals, 
see Re uven S. Avi-Yonah , From Income 10 Consumption Tax: Some lnternationallmpli-
cations, 33 San Diego L. Rev, 1329 (1996); David F. Bradford, Blue print for International 
Tax Reform, 26 Brook. J . Int'l L. 1449 (2001); Michael J. Gracu, Inte rnational Aspects of 
Fundamental Tax Restructuring: Practice or Principle?, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 1093 (1997); 
Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, The International Implicat ions of Consumption Tax 
Proposals, 48 Nat'l Tax J, 619 (1995); Ste phen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, Selected 
Inte rnational Aspects o f Fundamental Tax Reform Proposals, 51 U. Miami L Rev. 1029 
(1997). 
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to the VAT when consumed abroad under the standard credit-invoice 
method VATs imposed around the world.45 Many subtraction-method 
VAT proponents view that result as raising a competitiveness issue, 
and propose closing the system internationally to address this con-
cern46-although economists generally suggest that such treatment 
should not affect a country's trade position.'H Further issues associ-
ated with the taxation of imports and exports under credit-invoice and 
subtraction-method VATs are discussed in Part III. In the domestic 
context, however, proponents of U.S. subtraction-method VAT pro-
posals recommend an open system on simplification grounds. The 
goal is described as allowing " businesses to use their most basic finan-
cial data to compute tax liability."48 
III. KEy D ESICN FEATURES IN Tl1 E SUBTRACTION-METI10D AND 
CREDIT-INVOICE M ETHOO VATs 
A. Deductions for Purchases from Nontaxpayers 
As a result of deductions by purchase rs that are not offset by corre-
sponding inclusions by sellers, any open subtraction-method VAT 
would be susceptible to significant tax avoidance. Limiting deductions 
4S Many U.S. companies oppose this treatment of exports and imports. Hufbauer & 
Grieco, nOle 20, at 57; Carol Gabyzon & Gary C. Hufbauer, Fundamenlal Tax Reform and 
Border Adjustments (1996). The Flat Tax and the original X-Tax proposal, bOlh discussed 
in note 4, were origin-based and therefore lacked border adjuslments, which made them 
less anractive to U.S. companies. 
46 See, e.g., Hulbauer & Grieco, note 20; David A . Hartman, Proposal for Comprehen-
sive Tax Reform via Ihe Business Transfer Tax, Submission 10 the President's Advisory 
Panel on Federal Tax Reform (Apr. 29, 2(1(}5), al hllp:lIgovinfo.1ibrary.unt.edultaxreform 
panellcommenls/index8859.hlml?FuseAction=Home.View&Topic_id==3&FellowType_id 
== 4. 
47 Because an origin-based tax does not tax the full value of imported goods and services 
that arc consumed domestically, it appears 10 favor imports. Economic theory suggests the 
benefit to imporls from origin -basis treatment will be offset by currency exchange rates or 
other changes in the price level. The most basic nOlion is that a currency appreciation 
triggered by border adjustments will negate any permanent improvement in competitive-
ness. See, e.g., Alan D. Viard, Border Adjustmenls Won't Promote Compeliliveness, 105 
Tax Notes 122, 122 (Oct. 4, 20(4). Some ana lysts poinl out, however, that "fundamental" 
forces do not easily explain exchange rale adjustments. If exchange rates do not adj ust 
properly, economic theory suggests that in the long run, the relevant adjustments could 
occur through adjuslments in domestic prices and wages. The possibility that adjustments 
would occur other than through exchange ra tes and over an extended Iransition period has 
been a source of concern for various analysts, including the Tax Reform Panel. Tax Re-
form Panel Report , note 11 , at 173. FUTlhermore, these adjuslments will nOI appear cer-
lain, while border adjustments are both immediate and certain, such thai U.S. companies 
do nOl readily accept economists' assurances in this regard. See, e.g., Graetz. nOle 18, al 
81. 
48 David L Boren , Sialement Before the Bipartisan Commission on EntillemeDt and 
Tax Reform (Oct. 6, 1994), reprinted in 94 TNT 198-38, Oct. 7, 1994. available in LEXlS, 
Tax AnalysIS File. 
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for imports (as is done in the Boren-Danforth and Gibbons proposals) 
can solve this problem with respect to cross-border transactions, but 
does not address the problem more generally. Thus, even if the VAT 
is closed internationally, the absence of an invoice requirement or 
similar limitation could significantly reduce the amount of revenue the 
VAT collects for the fisc. 
David Bradford, David Weisbach, and Joseph Bankman and 
Michael Schier detail various potential problems of adopting a con-
sumption tax system in which deductions are genera lly available for 
inputs on which consumption tax was nol paid by the seller.49 One 
important concern is susceptibility to transfer pricing abuse.5O Trans-
fer prices are the amount charged by re lated entities in sales and 
transfers to one another. These entities have incentives to set prices in 
their transactions with one another to minimize tax, rather than on an 
arm's length basis. The transfer pricing problem can be ameliorated if 
the VAT is closed in te rnationally and coexists with an income tax sys-
tem domestically. 
Another important problem arises because the VAT is a tax on con-
sumpt ion-financial transactions are excluded. Thus, VATs do not re-
quire inclusion of in te rest or dividends received, and do not provide 
deductions for interest paid. This feature makes the tax economically 
efficient, and is also an important reason the tax is simple. Maintain-
ing the efficiency and simplicity of the VAT, however, requires draw-
ing a sharp distinction between "real" and financial transact ions. 
Taxpayers would find it easy to manipulate that distinction to their 
advantage in an open subtraction-method system.51 
Bankrnan and SchIer provide the example of a taxpaye r entering 
into offsetting long and short forward contracts for the delivery of 
goods, The taxpayer settles the favorable side of the stradd le for cash, 
resulting in nontaxable gain from a financial transaction , and takes 
delivery on the unfavorable transaction, resulting in a deductible 
purchase.52 Imagine an airline that enters into two forward con-
., See Bradford. X-Tax, note 4; Weisbach nOle 25; Joseph Bankman & Michael Sch ier, 
Tax Planning Under the Flat TaxIX-Tax 19 (Sept. 12, 2005), (draft, available at http:// 
www.americantaxpolicyinslitute.orpjpdflFaIIConference2005INYCorp_2532993_3.pdf). 
so Bradford focused heavily on the transfer pricing concern in the course of his writings 
regarding Ihe international aspects of the X-Tax. See, e.g., Bradford, X-Tax, note 4. 
SL The distinction between exempt financial instilutions and other insli tu tions is also 
susceptible 10 manipulation in slandard credil-invoice method VATs to reduce VAT liabil-
ity among related parties. See, e.g., Case C-255JOZ, Halifax v. Comm'rs of Customs & 
Excise, 2006 E.CR. 1-01609; Peter Nias & Amy Manchia, Halifax Judgment Raises VAT 
Planning Questions, 42 Tax Notes Inl ' l 7 (Apr. 3, 2006). 
52 Bankman & Schier, note 49, at 19. Other examples provided by Weisbach and Bank-
man and Schier, such as valuation problems associated with sales of assets by an individual 
to a business that they own . id. at 43; Weisbach note 25, at 632·33, may be less severe in a 
panial replacement VAT than in the full replacement consumption tax scenario those au-
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tracts~one to buy fuel at $2 per gallon, and one to sell fuel at $2 per 
gallon. If fuel costs $3 at the closing date of the contract , the airline 
could close out the long contract to buy fuel for $1 in cash, spend $3 to 
buy fuel on the market, deduct $3, and deliver that fuel to the 
counterparty of the unfavorable contract for $3. The airline has $1 in 
nontaxable financial gain, and $1 of net VAT deduction. In contrast , if 
fuel costs $1 at the closing date of the contract, the airline could close 
out the short contract to sell fuel for $1 in nontaxable financial gain, 
take delivery on the unfavorable contract for $2, and either use the 
fuel or reseH it fOf $1, in either case providing an extra $1 of net VAT 
deduction. In a system with an invoice requirement, however, the 
purchases of fuel will be deductible only if they are offset by taxable 
inclusions to registered traders. As a result, there will be no overall 
loss to the tax system. In an open subtraction-method VAT, however, 
a transaction involving a nonregistered trader (who therefore would 
not have a VAT inclusion) would result in a deduction for a registered 
trader. Weisbach suggests that in an open subtraction-method VAT 
"[gJiven that no risk is involved, businesses can use this type of trans-
action to eliminate business taxes at any time by simply doing it in 
greater size. " 53 
Standard credit-invoice method systems avoid this issue by denying 
input credits for purchases from nonregistered traders. A sophisti -
cated subtraction-method VAT produces the same result by making 
purchases [rom nonregistered traders nondeductible. 
B. Exemptions and Input Taxation 
Subtraction-method VAT advocates suggest that as an entity-based 
tax, the system is less susceptible to exemptions for specific goods and 
services than a credit-invoice method VAT.54 In an open subtraction-
method VAT, however, the lack of matching between deductions and 
inclusions creates an incentive for lobbying for inappropriate tax ex-
emptions by producers of intermediate inputs. The Japanese example 
also suggests subtraction-method VATs may include exemptions. 
Moreover, some exemptions may be appropriate or inevitable in any 
VAT. Finally, while a sophisticated subtraction-method VAT may be 
less susceptible to exemptions for specific goods and services, it may 
be more likely to be implemented with inappropriate entity-based 
exemptions. 
thors consider, depending on the tax (;onsequcnces to the nonregistered trader under the 
remaining income tax system. 
~J Weisba(;h . note 25. at 616. 
54 See, e.g., William Morris, A "National Debate" on VAT: The Gibbons Proposal, 93 
TNT 182-103 (Sept. 1, 1993), available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File. 
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VATs typica lly provide three di ffere nt types of exemptions. First, 
supplies of goods and services provided by government entities, as 
well as nonprofit organizations, charitable organizations, and similar 
tax-exempt entities are often exempted from the VAT for administra-
ti ve, distribut ional, or othe r policy reasons.55 Second, for similar rea-
sons, specific goods and services (for example, "merit goods" like 
educational services and health services) may a lso be exempted from 
the VAT regardless of the nature of the e ntity that makes the sup-
plies.56 Finally, small businesses may receive entity exemptions in rec-
ognition of the constraints on their administrative capacity.57 
lmportantly, VATs, whether of the credit-invoice method or subtrac-
tion-me thod type, generally do not provide exemptions for categories 
of purchase rs, as is commonly done in RSTs.58 VATs do provide 
somewhat similar treat ment, however, by offering refunds of input tax 
paid with respect to supplies that are not taxed. This mechanism is 
known as "zero-rating."59 This Section deals only with ce rtain issues 
that arise generally in relation to the provision of an exempt good or 
service ("exempt supplies"). Issues related to zero-rating, and the 
policy issues posed by VAT exemptions or zero-rating that benefit 
specific categories of entities, notably nonprofit and charitable organi-
zations, state and local governme nts, small business, and exporters are 
discussed in late r Sections. 
In a cred it-invoice method VAT, no VAT is coll ected on exempt 
supplies. Similarly, a registered trader wi ll not receive input cred its 
~~ See, e.g .. Council Directive 2006/1 12, art. 132,2006 O.J. (L 347) I (EC) Ihereinafler 
EU VAT Directive]. 
~ See, e.g., Excise Tax Act, R.S.c., ch. E IS § 223(1)(2009) (Can.), available at hnp:1I 
laws.justice.gc.calen/E-15/i ndex.html [hereinafter Canada ETAJ; see Pierre-Pascal Gen· 
dron, How Shou ld the US. Treat Government Entities, Nonprofit Organ ilations, and 
Other Ta)[-Exempt Bodies Under a VAT?, 63 Tax L. Rev. 477 (2010): see also Office of Tax 
PoI'y, U.S. Treas. Dep't, Approaches to Improve the Competitiveness of the U.s. Business 
Tax System for the 21st Century 22 (2007), ava ilable al http://www.ustreas.gov/pressf 
releascs/reportslhp749_approachesstudy.pdf. 
~7 Small Manufacturers or Producers Exemption Regula tions (Excise Tax Act) SOR/82-
498 (Can.) avai lable at ht tp://www.ca nli i.orglen/callawsJregu/sor-82-498Ilatest/sor-82· 
498.html; see Michael J. G raetl, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the 
U.s. Tax System, 112 Yale LJ . 261, 287-88 (2002); Gen. Accounting Office, Tax Adm inis-
trat ion: Potential Impact of Alternative Taxes on Taxpayers and Administ ra tors 140 
(1998), avai lable at http://www.gao.gov/archiveJl9981gg98037.pdf; Ebrill e t a I. , note 16, ch. 
I!. 
S8 Some exceptions may apply in some jurisdictions. for example in the case of exports 
or readily identifiable sales to governmcnts and mul tilateral institut ions. See Schenk & 
Oldman, note 13, a t 298; Charles E. McLu re, Jr., How to Coordinate State and Local Sales 
Taxes with a Federal Value-Added Tax, 63 Tax L. Rev. 639 (2010). 
39 Zero-ra ting means that, while VAT is charged at a lero rate on Ihe supply of goods or 
services, the supplier remains entit led to claim input tax credit for input tax incurred in 
making that supply, and therefore may be eligible for a refund of input lax pa id. Zero-
rating is discussed at Section III.o . 
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for inputs associated with the provision of exempt supplies. In a sub-
traction~method VAT, revenues from the sale of exempt supplies are 
excluded from the registered trader's VAT base. A sophisticated sub-
traction-method VAT would also deny deductions for inputs associ-
ated with the exempt good or service. For this reason, exemption in a 
credit-invoice method VAT or a sophisticated subtraction-method 
VAT can also be characterized as "input taxation." In contrast, ex-
emption in an open subtraction-method VAT will not result in the de-
nial of deductions associated with the exempt good or service, 
producing a gap in the tax base. 
Thus, while exemption of an intermediate-stage good or service in 
an open subtraction-method VAT reduces total tax collected in the 
value chain, exemption of an intermediate-stage good or service in a 
credit-invoice method VAT increases total tax collected in the value 
chain. Using the facts of Example I, Example 3 suggests that if wine 
sold by a winemaker is exempt under a credit-invoice method VAT, 
$100 of that wine, when sold by a retailer to an end consumer, will 
bear $26 of VAT on the inputs and final product. In contrast, if the 
same $100 of wine is sold by a retailer under an open subtraction-
method VAT with an exemption for sales by the winemaker, the wine 
will bear only $12 of VAT. 
EXAMPLE 3 
Grape 
Grower Winemaker Retailer Total 
Basic Transactions 
Sales $30 $70 $100 
Purchases 0 30 70 
Value added (sales - purchases) 30 40 30 $100 
Credit-Invoice Method VAT 
Tax on sales (20% of line 1) 6 Exempt 20 
Less: input tax on purchases 0 6 0 
Net VAT liability 6 Exempt 20 26 
Open Subtraction-Method VAT 
VAT liability (20% of line 3) 6 Exempt 6 12 
A standard credit-invoice method VAT regime does not provide the 
retailer with an input credit for wine purchased from the winemaker 
because no VAT was assessed on the sale of the wine. In addition, the 
retailer does not receive a credit for the $6 VAT paid by the 
winemaker on its purchase of grapes, the tax cost of which will be 
passed on to the retailer in the price of the wine. Thus, a credit-in-
voice method VAT with an exemption for an intermediate-stage good 
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cascades, resulting in a tax burden on consumption of the final good 
that is higher than the standard VAT rate, and an incentive for se lf· 
supply of the exempt intennediate input by seUers of the final good. 
In contrast, in an open subtraction-method VAT (where the VAT is 
calculated based on total sales and total purchases) whether the 
winemaker's sales were exempt from the VAT is irrelevant to the cal-
culation of the retailer's subtraction-method VAT liability. 
Advocates of subtraction-method VATs may claim that such a VAT 
is more likely 10 be imposed on a broad base, and avoid exemptions 
for specific goods and services because it is entity-based.60 Under the 
credit-invoice method VAT, however, providers of intermediate goods 
prefer their sales to be fully taxed. if they are not , goods and services 
that incorporate their products become more expensive to final con-
sumers. In contrast, an open subtraction-method VAT with an ex-
emption for an intermediate good produces a lower-than-standard tax 
burden on consumption of the final gOOd. An open subtraction-
method VAT therefore invites lobbying for special treatment by prov-
iders of intermediate inputs to other businesses.61 The reduction in 
the tax collected in the value-added chain creates a tax- induced pref-
erence for their goods or services if those goods or services are 
exempt. 
These results are not, however, due to the credit method or subtrac-
tion method of calculation. A sophisticated subtraction-method VAT 
would deny a ded uction to the re tailer for the purchase of the case of 
wine in Example 3, producing the same effect as under the credit-in-
voice method VAT.62 In that case, the winemaker would prefer to be 
taxed rather than to be exempt, as in the credit-invoice method VAT. 
Thus, one might believe that a sophisticated subtraction-method 
VAT would be more likely to avoid exemptions for specific goods and 
se rvices than a credit-invoice method VAT. On the other hand, the 
Japanese VAT, which is largely a closed system, has some of the same 
exemptions one finds in most credit-invoice method VATs. For exam-
ple, the Japanese exempt supplies of medical services and educational 
services.6J The Japanese example would seem to cast doubt on the 
claim that an entity-based system of calculation limits exemptions for 
socia lly preferred goods and services. 
60 See, e.g., Hufbauer & Grieco, note 20, at 71; sec also Danforth & Boren, note 33. 
61 McLure, nOIC 24, at 75. 
62 Mintz., nOle 21, at 76-77; Charles E. McLure, Jr., Economic, Administrat ive, and Polit-
ical Factors in Choosing a General Consumption Tax, 46 Nat'l Tax J, 345, 350 (1993). 
6J The Japanese VAT also exemptS other so-<:alled social welfare services (for example. 
Japan exempts meal delivery to the elderly, crematory services, and equipment for the 
physically handicapped), See Japanese MiniSlry of Finance, nOle 39, at 156-57. 
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Furthermore, although the re are good policy arguments for mini-
mizing exemptions generally, no country has removed all exemptions 
from its VAT.64 The broad, but rea listic, consumption tax base recom-
mended in 2005 by the Tax Reform Panel fo r the credit-invoice 
method VAT it studied fo r the United States would include about 
60% of GDP.65 New Zealand has the broadest VAT base in use in the 
DEeD today, but still offers ce rtain exemptions, including fo r resi-
dential accommodation, certa in supplies made by nonprofit e ntities, 
and the supply of certain fine metals.66 In the rest of the DEeD , ser-
vices like health care and education often are referred to as pOlitica lly 
"untouchable," and exempted, or given more preferential treatment 
through zero-rating.67 The Tax Reform Panel recommended exempt-
ing charitable and religious services, leases of residential housing, and 
sales of pre-existing owner-occupied housing in the parti al replace-
ment VAT it studied for the United States.68 Design planning for a 
VAT should likely be prepared to accommodate at least some exemp-
tions for specific goods and services. 
While using the subtraction-method lens to design a VAT may make 
exemptions of specific goods and services less likely, it also may make 
entity-based exemptions more like ly. Limited li ability corporations, S 
corporations, partnershi ps, and sole proprietorshi ps are not subject to 
the current U.S. corporate income tax. Rather, their income is gener-
ally taxed to individual owners, who flow the income through to their 
individual income tax re turns.69 O ne recent subtraction-method VAT 
proposal, put forth by Hufbauer and Grieco, exempts such [Jow-
through entities from being registered traders, on the theory that they 
are not subject to the current corporate income tax.70 In studying a 
subtraction-method VAT approach to business tax reform in the 
United States, the U.S. Treasury Department's report similarl y consid-
ered, as one of the potential issues, whether flow-through entities 
would be treated as registe red traders. 71 In a VAT, however, wide-
64 David Williams, Value_Added Tax, in I Tax Law Design and Drafting 204 (Victor 
Thuronyi cd., 1996); New Zealand Inland Revenue, Exempt Supplies, available al http:// 
www.ird.govt.n7Jgstladditional-calcs/ca]c-spec-supplies/calc-exempt (last visited Feb. 13. 
2010). 
~ Tax Refonn Panel Report , note 11, at 249-55. 
66 New Zealand Inland Revenue, note 64; Schenk & Oldman, note 13, at 289. 
67 See, e.g., David White, The Serious Research Gap on VAT/GST: A New Zealand 
Perspective After 20 Years of GST, IS lnt'l VAT Monitor 343 (2007); Gendron, note 56, a t 
716 n.5 1. Domestic zero-rating of goods and services is discussed in Section 111.0. 
68 Tax Refonn Panel Report, note Il , at 250-52. 
69 See IRC § 701 (partnerships), § 1361 (S corporat ions); Reg. § 3301.7701-3(b) (limited 
liabi lity companies). 
70 Hufba uer & Grieco. note 20, a t 71. 
71 Treasury Dep't, note 56, at 27-55; sec also U.S.-Chi na Econ. and Security Rev. 
Comm'n. Comprehensive Reform for U.s. Business Taxation (May 20, 2005) (statement of 
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spread exemptions for businesses across many sectors of the economy 
could undermine the integrity of the tax system.72 Flow-through busi-
nesses account for about one-third of gross business receipts in the 
United States.73 While in a broadly-applicable VAT businesses do not 
have an incentive to avoid paying VAT on their purchases (because 
they receive input credits), businesses that make exempt supplies, and 
therefore are ineligible for input credits, do have an incentive to avoid 
or evade VAT. Some subtraction-method VAT proposals have recog-
nized this issue and subjected now-through entities to VAT, while 
others have 0 01.14 The key point is that using the subtract ion-method 
lens opens this design issue to discussion- which would not be the 
case in a credit-invoice method VAT understood as a tax imposed at 
the cash register.15 
C. Multiple VAT Rutes 
Conventional analysis highlights that a credit-invoice method VAT, 
as distinct from a subtraction-method VAT, provides the flexibility to 
impose preferential tax rates on specific goods or services. Preferen-
tial tax rates for specific goods and services are generally undesirable. 
As a practical matter, however, policymakers may choose to impose 
multi ple rates. 
Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Pau l LE. Griero). available at htfp:l/www.uscc.gov/hearingsl20051 
hearingslwrittcn_testimonieslO5 _05_19 _2Owrtslhufbauer ....gary _ wrts.php) (proposing to re-
tain the income tax di!ninction between Subchapter C corporations and pass-through firms 
in a subtraction-method VAT). 
72 Williams, note 64, HI 208. 
n Treasury Dep't, Treasury Conference on Business Taxation and G lobal Competi tive-
ness, Background Paper 12 (July 23, 2001). available at http://www.uSlfeas.gov/press/re-
Icaseslreports/01230. pdr. 
7~ Compare Danforth & Boren, note 33 (subjecting all flow-through entit ies to VAT), 
with Hufbauer & Griero, note 20. at 71 (exempting them). 
7S In a subtraction·method VAT, the policy debate may be posed with refercnce to the 
~income" of noncorporate business entit ies. and as a result income tax assumptions may 
influence policymaking. See Hufba uer & Griero, note 20. at 39 (describing their "Corpo-
rale Activities Tax" proposal as a "business lax"). A somewhat related issue involves 
whether financial accounting would treat the credit-invoice method VAT and the subtrac-
tion-method VAT similarly or differently, and how firms would respond to the two taxes as 
a result. While a credit-invoice method VAT would be accounted for like a sales tax, a 
question might arise as to whether a subtraction-method VAT could or should be ac-
counted for like an income tax. Clear guidance on the appropriate accounting ror subtrac-
tion-method VATs is not available in the accounting literature under either U.s. GAAP Of 
IFRS. cr. Fin. Acetg. Stand. Bd, EITF 06-3, How Taxes Collected born Customers and 
Remitted to Governmental Authorities Should Be Presented in the Income Statement 
(That Is, Gross versus Net Presentation) (2006), available at http://www.rasb.orglcsIBlob 
Server?bIObcol:urldata&blobtable=M ungoBlobs& blobkey=id&blobwhere; 117 58187402 
08&blobheader:application%2Fpdf. 
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Returning to Example 1, imagine that grapes are taxed at 10% 
rather than 20%. As shown in Example 4, the grape grower will still 
net $30 after tax, but will charge only $33 and remit only $3 to the 
government , rather than charging $36 and remitting $6 as in Example 
2. The winemaker, in tum, will still charge $84 ($70 + 20% VAT, be-
cause she is selling wine, not grapes, and wine is subject to the stan-
dard 20% VAT rate). 
EXAMPLE 4 
Grape 
Grower Winemaker Retailer Total 
Basic Transoctions 
Pre-tax sales $30 $70 $100 
Pre-tax purchases 0 30 70 
Value added (sales - purchases) 30 40 30 $100 
Credit-Invoice Method VAT 
Tax on sales (10% of line 1 for 
grapes, 20% otherwise) 3 14 20 
Less: input tax on purchases 0 3 14 
Net VAT liability $ 3 $11 $ 6 $ 20 
The only difference between Example 2 and Example 4 is that in-
stead of subtracting $6 in tax already paid to determine what to remit 
to the government, the winemaker subtracts $3 from the $14 he col-
lects from the retailer, thereby paying $11 to the government. As a 
result , the same total amount is remitted to the government, and the 
preferential rate for grapes does not pass through. If, however, the 
grapes are purchased by the retailer and sold for consumption as fresh 
fruit, the preferential 10% rate for grapes will continue to apply and 
pass through to the final consumer. The same retailer will apply the 
standard 20% VAT rate on bottles of wine it sells. 
In contrast, without an invoice requirement, even a sophisticated 
subtraction-method VAT, cannot feasibly be administered with multi-
ple tax rates. Imagine a corner store that only sells fresh grapes and 
wine. It buys $200 of grapes and wine from registered traders, and has 
$300 of sales. If there are different lax rates for grapes and for wine, 
simply subtracting the value of the corner store's nonlabor inputs 
(grapes and wine) from the total value of its sales and then mUltiply-
ing by the VAT rate will not work to determine its VAT liability. To 
replicate the tax burden that the corner store would remit to the gov-
ernment in a credit-invoice method VAT, the tax authorities must 
know not only what part consisted of grapes and what part of the re-
tailer's sales consisted of wine, but what part of the retailer'S inputs 
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consisted of grapes, what part consisted of wine, and the tax rate paid 
on each o f these inputs, In the absence of an invoice requirement (or 
comparable info rmatio n co llectio n) the necessary info rmatio n is no t 
available.16 
At a theoretical level, it may be possible to impose multiple rates 
under a sophisticated subtraction-method VAT with a full invoice re-
quirement. Such a system seems highly complex at best . 1t would 
make partial exemptions and partial deductions the norm, rather than 
an exception. Consider again the example in which fresh fruit is taxed 
at a preferenti al rate, and a corner store sells fresh grapes and wine. If 
there are mUltiple rates and the corner store is to determine tax due in 
a single account, it must somehow " adjust" the value of its sales sub-
ject to the preferential rale .77 One way to do this might be to treat 
such sales as partially exempt. But fo r the calculation to work prop-
erly, the adjustment must be to pretax sales, rather than post-tax 
sales,78 Thus, instead of booking $120 of grape sales, the corne r store 
might book o ne-half the pretax value of such sales grossed up as if to 
include full VAT. Similarly, to account fo r deductions, it might deduct 
one-half the pretax cost of the grapes it bought from registe red traders 
grossed up as if to include full VAT. With multiple preferential rates, 
the math would become even more complica ted. These calculations 
are very different from using summary financial statement informa-
tion to simply subtract the value of the store's nonlabo r inputs from 
the to tal value of its sa les and then multiply by the VAT rate to de ter-
mine tax liability. More importantly, such calculatio ns effectively re-
quire determining tax liability with respect to individual classes o f 
76 Gen. Accounting O ffice, note 31, a l 23. 
n Exposi tion through an example may be eased somewhal by providing both tax-exclu-
sive and tax-inclusive tax rales. Imagine Ihe corner SlOre pays $100 fo r grapes purchased 
from registered traders ($90.91 of grapes, plus $9.09 of VAT imposed at a 10% tax-exclu-
sive rate, or a 9.09% lax- inclusive rate). It has $109.09 pre-VAT of grape sales. The corner 
store pays $100 for wine purchased from registered traders ($83.33 of wine, plus $16.67 of 
VAT imposed al a 20% lax-cl[clusivef16.66% lax-inclusive rale). It has $150 pre-VAT of 
wine sales. The corner store also purchases other business inpuls, such as price labels and 
shelving, used to sell both the grapes and Ihe wine, for $12 ($10 plus $2 of VAT imposed a t 
20% lax-el[clusive/16.66% lax-inclusive). The store sells the grapes for $120 ($109.10 plus 
$10.90 of VAT imposed al a 10% lax-txclusive/9.09% tax inclusive), and the wine fo r $180 
($150 plus $30 of VAT imposed al 20% tax-exclusiveI16.66% tax-inclusive). To adjust the 
value of its sales subject 10 the preferential ra te, instead of booking $120 of grape sales, the 
corner Slore mighl book one-half the pretal[ value of such sales, grossed up as if to include 
full VAT ($54.54 of prelal[ grape sales, plus $10.90 of hypothelical VAT , for a to tal inclu-
sion of $65.44). Similarly, to account for deductions, it might deduct only one-half the 
pretax cost of Ihe grapes it bought from registered (Taders, grossed up as if to include full 
VAT ($45.45 of pretax grape sales, plus $9.09 ofh ypolhelical VAT, for a $54.54 deduction). 
18 See note 77. 
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supplies. They would "transform the subtraction method . into 
something like the invoice method. "79 
Commentators frequently view the oddity of imposing multiple 
rates under a subtraction-method VAT as an advantage of the subtrac-
tion-method.so Most experts recommend that an ideal VAT generally 
should be imposed with a single non-zero rate.S] Preferential rates, 
like inappropriate exemptions of specific goods and services, under-
mine revenues, impede administration, and reduce efficiency.82 
Policymakers, however, may feel compelled to impose design fea-
tures that vary from the academic ideal. A significant number of 
GEeD countries maintain at least one non-zero preferential tax rate 
as part of their VATs.s3 The U.S. Treasury Department noted that 
there may be policy reasons to reduce or eliminate the rate of a VAT 
on "merit goods," such as education, health care, welfare services, cul-
tural activities, and religious and charitable activities.54 It also pointed 
out that while a lower VAT rate for necessities generally is viewed as 
an inefficient way to address perceived regressivity, policymakers 
could decide to tax food, electricity, heating oil and gas, and clothing 
at a lower rate.S5 Of interest in tbis regard are tbe conclusions of a 
2007 Japanese national tax reform commission that studied various 
potential tax reforms for Japan , including the possibility of adopting 
multiple VAT rates. The commission concluded that a subtraction-
method VAT with multiple rates would not be enforceable, so that if 
Japan were to adopt a multiple rate structure, it would also need to 
adopt a credit-invoice system for its VAT.86 
In comparing credit-invoice and subtraction-method VATs, the 
multiple rate issue may require a judgment regarding the political 
probability associated with various vagaries of the legislative process. 
Choosing a subtraction-method VAT may make the use of multiple 
rates less likely, as shown by the findings of the Japanese tax reform 
commission. A credit-invoice method VAT, however, is equally able 
to be imposed with a single non-zero rate. In fact , more than 70% of 
79 Ebrill et al., note 16, at 9-12. 
80 See, e.g., Oliver Oldman & Alan Schenk , The Business Activities Tax: Have Senators 
Danforth and Boren Discovered a Better Value-Added Tax?, 10 Tax Notes lot '155 (Jan. 2, 
1995). 
81 Ebrill et aI., note 16, at 69-82. 
8:2 Gendron, note 56, at 486--89. 
8J Centre for Tax Pol'y and Admin., OECD, Tax Database (Jan. 1, 2007), http://www. 
oecd.orgldocument/6010,3343,en_2649 _34533 _194246(U _1_1_1 ,OO.htmUitable_IVl (report-
ing 78.5% of DECO countries have at least one non-zero preferential rate). Worldwide, 
approximately one-half of all VATs include at least one non-uro preferential rate. Ebrill 
et ai. , note 16, al 68. 
114 Treasury Dep'l, note 56, al 31. 
lei Id. 
86 Japanese Tax Commission, note 43, at 28. 
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countries that adopted a credit-invoice method VAT in the 1990's 
adopted and maintained VATs with only one positive VAT rate.87 Ex-
tant subtraction-method VAT proposals suggest that a subtraction-
method VAT is likely to deviate from VAT best practices in various 
other respects, as described above with respect to deductions from 
nonregistered traders and the scope of application of the VAT, and 
below with respect to other issues of VAT design. Given the fact that 
a credit-invoice method VAT often is imposed at one non-zero rate, 
the question is what weight the prospect that it could be imposed at 
multiple rates should be given relative to other considerations. 
D. Zero-Rating 
Zero-rating a good or service means that while no VAT is due on 
the supply, the supplier remains entitled to claim a tax offset for input 
tax incurred in making that supply, and therefore may be eligible for a 
refund of input tax paid. Zero-rating is used primarily to "border ad-
just" exports of goods and services to achieve destination-basis taxa-
tion, and can provide a full refund for VAT paid with respect to a 
product in earlier stages of production and distribution. Zero-rating is 
possible in both a credit-invoice method VAT and a sophisticated sub-
traction-method VAT. Zero-rating produces a benefit similar to ex-
emption in an open subtraction-method VAT. 
Example 5 iUustrates the mechanics of zero-rating a supply using a 
VAT imposed via either the sophisticated subtraction method or the 
credit-invoice method. Example 5 is identical to Example J, except 
that the case of wine produced by the winemaker is purchased by an 
exporter and sold abroad. As a result, the wine is zero-rated and in-
put credit is provided to the exporter with respect to the VAT paid on 
the wine at earlier stages of production. The result is that the net VAT 
collected by the government on the wine is zero. 
t:J Ebrill et a l. , note 16, al 68~9 (data is as of 20Ot). 
334 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: 
EXAMPLE 5 
Grape 
Grower Winemaker Wine Exporter Total 
Basic Transuelions 
Pretax sales $30 $70 $100 outside the 
U.S. = $0 
(zero-rated) 
Pretax purchases 0 30 70 
Value added (sales - 30 40 -70 
purchases) 
Credit-Invoice Method VAT 
Tax on sales (20% of 6 14 0 
line 1) 
Less: input lax on 0 6 14 
purchases 
Net VAT liability 6 8 -14 SO 
Sophisticated Subtraction-Method VAT 
Subtraction-method 6 8 -14 0 
VAT (20% of line 
3) 
As discussed further below, zero-rating an export is not a tax pref-
erence under the destination basis for cross-border transactions be-
cause in that case it simply reflects that exports are consumed outside 
the jurisdictional reach of the national VAT and therefore should be 
taxed only in the jurisdiction of consumption. 
When there is a policy desire to provide a tax preference for certain 
goods or services, however, some countries deem it appropriate to 
zero-rate rather than exempt (that is, input tax) that good or service 
even when supplied for domestic consumption. The rationale for 
zero-rating domestically is that exemption (input taxation) is more ap-
propriate where administrative considerations make it undesirable to 
attempt to tax a particular good or service.88 With exemption, some 
tax is maintained on the exempted good or service because the inputs 
used in supplying that good or service are still taxed. If there is an 
affirmative desire to consistently remove all tax from a specific good 
or service, then zero-rating may be more appropriate.89 Zero-rating 
88 Sec, e.g., McLure, nOle 24, al 74---75; Aus!'! Treasury, Tax Reform: Not a New Tax, A 
New Tax System 91 (Aug. 1. 1998), available at http://www.treasury.gov.au/documentslI67/ 
PDFlWhitepaper.pdf. 
119 One corollary to the argument that zero-rating is more appropriate than exemption 
when there is an affirmative desire to remove all tax from a specific good or service is that 
a reduced rate (as part of a multiple rate system) is also more appropriate than an exemp-
tion if the goal is to provide a partial tax subsidy for a specifie good or service, as tbe 
amount of the subsidy is known and not dependent on tbe degree of vertical integration 
with respect to the supply of the good or service. 
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also has the benefit of eliminating any risk of cascading taxation or 
self-supply bias in connection with the zero-rated good or service.90 
Exemption in an open subtraction-method VAT effectively removes 
all the tax previously collected on that good in earlier stages of pro-
duction and distribution.91 Thus, in an open subtraction-method VAT 
zero-rating and exemption of a final-stage supply produces a similar 
benefit. An open subtraction-method system has no mechanism for 
"input taxing" a good or service where administrative considerations 
make exemption appropriate but maintaining some level of taxation is 
desired. As the example illustrates, zero-rating is possible in both a 
credit-invoice method VAT and a sophisticated subtraction-method 
VAT with one non-zero rate. 
E. Goods a1td Services Provided by Government 
and No,tprofit Organizations 
Goods and services supplied by nonprofit organizations and govern-
ment entities represent over 20% of U.S. GDP.92 Furthermore, state 
and local government accounts for two-thirds of this economic activ-
ity-or almost 13% of GDP.93 The relationship between the states 
and the federal government is a sensitive question with a constitu-
tional dimension. Thus, for reasons of both economic efficiency and 
political comity, a workable approach to the treatment of nonprofit 
organizations and government entities under the VAT is important to 
a well-administered VAT. The best practice approach focuses on the 
taxation of specific supplies, rather than entities, and thus may be 
more easily achieved in a credit-invoice method structure than in a 
subtraction-method structure. 
1. Ideal Treatment 
In his paper for this conference, Pierre-Pascal Gendron argues that 
in an ideal VAT, goods and services supplied by public sector bodies 
and charitable and nonprofit organizations would be within the scope 
90 Thus, for example, the Tax Reform Panel suggested zero-rating educational services 
and noncommercial government services in the credit-invoice method VAT it studied for 
the United States. Tax Reform Panel Report, note II, at 250-52. 
91 In principle, an open subtraction-method VAT could deny deductions proportionately 
based on the proportion of exempt to taxable sales. [n that case, cxemption of a fin al-stage 
good would produce a similar result to exemption in the credit-invoice method VAT. 
92 Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, National Economic Accounts, 
National Income and Products Accounts, Tb1.1.1.10, available at hllp:Jlwww.bea.gov/na. 
t ionaUnipawebffable View .asp?Se lectedTable: 14&Freq:Qtr& First Year",2008& Last Year: 
2010. 
93 Id. 
336 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: 
of a VAT.94 Very few such goods or services would be exempt from 
the VAT.9S Goods and services supplied for no (or nominal) consider-
ation, however, generally would be zero-rated.96 Those goods and 
services supplied by the public sector and the nonprofit sector that 
compete with private sector sales would be taxed.97 Thus, Gendron 
focuses on the nature of the good or service being supplied, rather 
than the entity that is supplying that good or service, in determining 
how to treat the activities of governments and nonprofit 
organizations. 
2. Supplies by Nonprofit Organizations 
Gendron recommends that the United States severely limit zero-
rating and exemptions for goods and services supplied by nonprofit 
and charitable organizations.98 Gendron notes that full taxation 
under a VAT for nonprofits and charitable organizations is consistent 
with exempt status under the income tax because taxable status under 
the VAT simply means that charitable and nonprofit entities act as 
VAT collection agents for the government with respect to a tax that is, 
and is widely understood to be, imposed on consumers.99 Further, be-
cause supplies for no or nominal consideration generally would not be 
taxed on their implicit fair market value, those supplies by charitable 
and nonprofit entities would receive treatment that is similar in effect 
to zero-rating. lOO 
Both a sophisticated subtraction-method VAT and a credit-invoice 
method VAT could be used to implement these design recommenda-
tions. As Gendron points out, however, the rationale for full taxation 
of charitable and nonprofit entities turns on thinking of these entities 
as collection agents for a tax imposed on consumers, rather than as 
being "consumers" subject to the tax themseives. IOI Conventionally 
the credit-invoice method VAT is thought of as a tax imposed on a 
consumer and collected by the selling entity at the cash register, 
whereas the subtraction-method VAT is thought of as a tax that is 
~ Gendron, nOie 56, at 479. 
95 Id. al 508. 
96 Id. at 486. 
'11 Id. at 507-08. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 5Q6....07. 
100 In comparison, the Boren-Danforth proposal would have subjected charities de-
scribed in current § 501(c)(3) to the VAT only with respect to their business activities that 
would be subject to the unrelated business income tax under currenl law (§ 512). Other 
nonprofil organizations would have been fully subject to the VAT, including with respect 
to the fair market value of their supplies not made for fair market value consideration. 
Danforth & Boren, note 33. 
101 Gendron, note 56, 3t 506. 
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imposed on the entity. As a result, the conceptual framework that 
justifies full taxation of nonprofit entities with zero-rating for any sup-
plies for which they do nOl charge consideration may be an easier fit 
with the credit-invoice method than the subtraction me thod. 
3. State and Local Goverrlment Services 
Gendron concludes that given potential constitutional limitations in 
the United States on mandating state and local governments to collect 
a federal tax on the goods and services they provide, \02 the most feasi-
ble policy for the United States may be to exempt supplies by state 
(and local) governments, but allow them to elect to make taxable sup-
plies. The notion is that for a governmental entity providing mostly 
public goods, opting in to collecting the VAT (and consequently re-
ceiving zero-rating for most of the goods and services they supply) will 
be more attractive than remaining exempt as an entity.t03 Again, at a 
theoretical level, both a sophisticated subtraction-method VAT and a 
credit-invoice method VAT could be used to implement this design 
recommendation. Revealingly, however, the Japanese VAT simply 
exempts local government from VAT.t04 From a political economy 
perspective, asking state and local governments to pay a subtraction-
method VAT may appear similar to asking those governments to pay 
company income tax. In the United States it may be more palata ble 
to ask the states to consider choosing to assess a credit-invoice method 
tax on specific transactions where they provide commercial services 
that may compete with the private sector, and providing them strong 
incentives to do so through the opt-in regime recommended by 
Gendron. 
F. Real Estate 
The appropriate treatment of residential housing and other real 
property is important in a VAT both because residential housing rep-
)02 Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405,424 (1938) (upholding federa l taxation of em-
ployees of the Port Authority of New York as falling outside the state immunity from 
federal taxation reserved for "essential government functions ," while noting that " there 
may be state agencies of such a character and so intimately associated with the perform-
ance of an indispensable function of state government that any laxation of it would 
threaten such interference with the funct ions of government itself as to be considered be-
yond the reach of the federal taxing power"); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.s. 898, 
935 ( 1997) ("The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to 
address particular problems, nor command the States ' officers, or those of thelr political 
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulawry program."). 
HO Gendron, note 56, at 506. 
104 See Japanese Ministry of Finance, note 39, a1 182. 
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resents approximately 15% of gross domestic product,IOS and because 
of the political importance of residential housing. I06 Taxation of resi-
dential real properly under a VAT is complicated by issues such as 
whether it would be appropriate to tax the imputed rental value of 
home ownership, and also requires distinguishing between real prop-
erty investment and consumption as well as personal versus business 
use of real property.107 The Tax Reform Panel , consistent with the 
recommendation of various experts and the general approach taken in 
Canada and New Zealand,108 recommended that the sale and rental of 
immovable property generally should be taxable, but that residential 
rent should be exempt from VAT, as should the sale of previously 
occupied residential property. t o'} Similarly, in his paper for this con-
ference, Satya Poddar generally describes a structure that exempts 
long-term residential rent, fully taxes supplies of construction services 
and the first sale of new residential property, and exempts the resale 
of used residential dwellings, as the most practical one for taxing resi-
dential real property under a VAT.llo 
VATs in existence around the world take a variety of approaches to 
the taxation of real property, but all utilize exemption and zero-rating. 
Because of the perception that exemptions and zero-rating for specific 
goods and services are inappropriate in a subtraction-method system, 
it may be more difficult to legislate any solution involving exemption 
or zero-rating in a subtraction-method VAT. Residential rent paid to 
a real estate management company may not seem deserving of ex-
emption when the tax is perceived to be assessed on the "income" of 
the e.ntity receiving the payment , rather than the individual to whom 
housing is supplied. Neither the Boren-Danforth nor the Gibbons 
subtraction-method VAT proposals provided special rules to exempt 
residential rent , although the definition of taxable activity in those 
proposals would appear to exempt the resale of owner-occupied hous-
lOS Bureau of Eco". Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, 
National Data: A. Selected NiPA Tables 0-11 tb1.1.5.5 (Dec. 2009), available at http:" 
www.bea.gov/scbJpdU2009112%20DecemberlD.PageslI209dp&.-a.pdf. 
106 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,369, § 3(b), 10 Fed. Reg. 2323 (Jan. 7, 2005) (mandating 
that the Tax Reform Panel should recommend options to make the lax code simpler, fairer, 
and more conducive to economic growth, while "recognizing the importance of home 
ownership"). 
107 See Schenk & Oldman, nOie 13, at 408--31. 
108 Canada ETA, nole 56, sched. V; Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, 1985. S.N.Z. No. 
141 § #A (N.Z.). 
1Il9 Tax Rerorm Panel Report, note II, at 252; Sijbren Cnossen, VAT Treatment o( im-
movable Properly, in I Tax Law Design, note 64, at 231, 243-45. 
110 Satya Poddar, Taxation or Housing Under a VAT, 63 Tax L Rev. 443 (2010). 
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jog,l ll Poddar observes that such treatment tends to be regressive and 
is not economically neutral. lI2 
G. Financial Services 
As described earlier, financial payments are excluded from the VAT 
base. Many financial services are therefore difficult to tax under a 
VAT because implicit fees for financial services typically are imbed-
ded in interest rate spreads and financial margins associated with fi -
nancial payments. The value of the financial intermediation fee 
imbedded in these interest rate spreads and financial margins is diffi-
cult to dete rmine. As Alan Schenk explains in another paper for this 
conference, the goal should be to tax at least all business-Io-business 
supplies of financial services under a VAT, so that the financial institu-
tions rendering those services can recover VAT on their business in-
puts just like any other firm, and so that the tax does nol cascade.113 
Unfortunately " [n]o convincing conceptually correct and practical so-
lution for capturing the bulk of financial services under the VAT has 
yet been developed. "114 Many commentators generally view the total 
global value of the intermediation services rendered by financial insti-
tutions to be susceptible to calculation , but no acceptable method has 
been devised to calculate the value of the services rendered to each 
de positor and borrower on a transaction-by-transaction basis.llS 
The most common approach to the taxation of financial intermedia-
tion in credit-invoice method VATs worldwide is to exempt financial 
intermediation services, thereby using input taxation as a substitute 
for full taxation of financial services on the theory that taxation is ap-
propriate but impractical. I 16 Exemption of financial services (in a 
credit-invoice method VAT or a sophisticated subtraction-method 
VAT) produces at least two significant problems: cascading and self-
supply bias.! 17 An increasing number of countries are experimenting 
IllS. 2160, note 33; H.R. 4050, note 34. 
112 Poddar, note 110, at 452. 
113 Alan & he nk. , Taxation of Financial Services (Including Insurance) Under a U.s. 
Value-Added Tax, 63 Tax L. Rev. 409 (2010). Cascading results from any exemption for 
intermediate inputs, as described in Section 111.8. 
114 Richard M. Bird & Pierre-Pascal Gendron, The VAT in Developing and Transitional 
Countries 96 (2007). 
II~ Sec Schenk. no te 113, at 430. The author is grateful 10 Emil Sunlcy fo r discussions 
regarding this issue. 
116 See, e.g., Pierre-Pasca l Gendron, Canada: VAT Treatment of Financial Services: As-
sessment and Policy Proposal for Developing Countries, 62 Bull. Int'l Tax'n 494, 497 
(2008). 
117 Cascading arises because financial services are often supplied to other businesses, for 
which those financial services a re an inte rmediate input. The self-supply bias arises be-
cause as exempt entities, fi nancial service providers cannot make use of input credits. 
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with solutions to the problems caused by exempting financial services. 
For example, New Zealand recently revised its law so as to zero-rate 
certain business-to-business financial services in order to reduce cas-
cading, while continuing to exempt financial services supplied to con-
sumers, in order to ensure that the consumption of financial services 
by final consumers is taxed, partially and indirectly, by denying finan-
cial services providers full recovery of their VAT input tax.IIS Most 
alternatives to exemption implemented in jurisdictions with a VAT in-
volve distinguishing between various types of financial service supply, 
so that some financial services remain exempt while others are taxable 
or zero-rated.]]9 Schenk generally recommends exempting a narrow 
range of specifically-defined financial services, rather than financial 
services entities more generally.no 
Taxation of financial services may seem simpler under a subtrac-
tion-method VAT than under a credit-invoice method VAT. Particu-
larly in an open subtraction-method VAT, which does not endeavor 10 
match deductions and inclusions, it may not seem necessary to devise 
a mechanism to calculate the value of the services rendered to each 
depositor and borrower on a transaction-by-transaction basis. If, how-
ever, a system were implemented to tax the total global value of the 
intermediation services rendered by financial institutions, that tax 
would cascade unless a mechanism were developed to allow business 
users of financial services to claim input credits with respect to the 
financial services supplied to them. For example, Israel taxes banks 
and insurance companies under an "addition-method" VAT,12I but 
the tax is administered separately from the Israeli VAT, banks and 
insurance companies cannot recover VAT on their business inputs, 
and the users of financial services cannot claim input credits with re-
spect to financial services that are provided to them. ]22 
In recognition of the potential cascading problem associated with 
full taxation of financial service providers in a subtraction-method 
VAT, the Boren-Danforth proposal required financial service provid-
ers to report the implicit charge for intermediation services to busi-
118 See Michael Cullen, Div. Inland Revenue Dep' t, Taxation (Annual Rates. GST, 
Trans·Tasman ImpUiation and Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill: Commentary on the Bill, 
a va ita ble at http://www.ird.govt.nzlresources/5Jc15c 15a 1804bbe353b913ed1bc87554a301 
maybill03.pdf. 
1\9 See, e.g., Satya Poddar. VAT on Financial Services-Searching for a Workable Com-
promise. in GST in Retrospect and Prospect 186-89 (Richard Krever & David White eds., 
2007). 
120 Schenk, note II3, at 438-39. 
121 The addition-method VAT requires taxable entities 10 calculate tax liability by ad-
ding the cost of the firm's economic factors of production plus a measure of profit ror VAT 
purposes, and multiplying the ]otal by the tax rate. See Schenk & Oldman, note 13. at 43. 
122 Id. at 328. 
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ness users. The proposal, however, did not provide a methodology for 
determining that implicit charge. 123 The lack of such a me thodology 
illustrates that to avoid the cascading pro blem, a subtraction-method 
VAT must calculate the value of the services re ndered to each recipi-
e nt of financial services-thereby recreating the most significant prob-
lem encountered with taxing financial services under the credit-
invoice me thod VAT. Without such a calculation, registered traders 
are overtaxed on fin ancial services because VAT imbedded in finan-
cial services received is not recoverable by these registe red traders 
when they make their own supplies. In contrast, the subtraction-
method system may make it easier to ensure full taxation of house-
hold consumption of financial services. Whether a system that over-
taxes financial services supplied to business, and fully taxes financial 
services supplied to consumers is preferable to a system that overtaxes 
financial services supplied to business and undertaxes financial ser-
vices supplied to consumers is not at all clear. Some commentators 
suggest that the optimal rate of tax for financial services may be a 
lower-than-standard rate. l24 
While the open subtract ion-method VAT, the credit-invoice method 
VAT, and the sophisticated subtract ion-method VAT all face the same 
challenges in structuring a workable system to properly tax financial 
intermediation, the open subtraction-method VAT cannot properly 
manage the distinction between real and financial transactions. This 
makes the manipulation of the "rea l vs. financial" distinction a source 
of potential tax avoidance by nonfinancial institutions in the open-
subtraction method VAT.12S Both the credit-invoice method VAT and 
the sophisticated subtraction-method VAT avoid this problem, and 
both could accommodate exemption , zero-rating, or most other solu-
tions fo r the taxation of financial services adopted by governments or 
considered in the literature, including cash flow taxation and various 
modifications thereof.126 Taxation of fin ancial se rvices is " the major 
m Danforth & Boren, note 100 ("We would expect Ihe Secretary of the Treasury 10 
issue regulal ions regarding the requirements for reasonably allocaling implicil fees among 
the recipiellls of financial intcrmedialion sen'ices. These regula lions cou ld provide general 
rules for allocating fees for different types of fin ancia l intermediaries or specific rules for 
certain fina ncial intermediaries."). 
\24 Sec, e.g., Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, Theoretical Perspective on the Taxation 
of Capital Income and Financial Services, in Taxation of Financiallnlermediation: Theory 
and Praclice for Emerging Economies 31 (Patrick Honohan ed., 2003); see also Harry 
Grubert & James Mackie, Must Financial Services Be Taxed Under a Consumption Tax, 53 
Nat'l Tax J. 23 (2000) (suggesting that a range of financial services provided to households 
should be treated as nontaxable). 
125 See Section III.A. 
116 See Satya Poddar & Morley English, Taxation of Financial Services Under a Value-
Added Tax, SO Nat 'l Tax J. 89 (1997); Howell Zee, A New Approach to Taxing Financial 
Intermediation Services Under a Value-Added Tax, 58 Nat' l Tax J. 77 (2005). 
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remammg frontier"127 for the VAT. Fifty years of experience with 
credit-invoice method VATs have led tax administrations to identify 
best practices for the credit-invoice method VAT in most areas of con-
sumption taxation. In financial services, however, no convincing best 
practice has emerged. A priori, either a sophisticated subtraction-
method VAT or a credit-invoice method VAT could be used to ad-
dress the relevant challenges. Nevertheless, exemption of a limited 
set of specific financial services of the sort recommended by 
Schenk,l28 as well as the zero-rating approach taken by some jurisdic-
tions, may each seem more appropriate in a credit-invoice method 
VAT. 
H. Small Business 
As part of their credit· invoice method VATs, approximately two-
thirds of OEeD countries allow small businesses to elect to be exempt 
from collecting tbe VAT.I 29 Exempted businesses tend to account for 
a relatively smaU fraction of gross receipts and continue to pay VAT 
on their inputs, limiting the revenue loss generated by this pOlicy. no 
Further, small businesses with registered traders as their main custom· 
ers generally will voluntarily choose to register to collect the VAT, 
even though they are eligible for exemption, in order to pass input tax 
credits on to their customers. Thus an opt ional VAT exemption for 
small business, if implemented with a reasonable threshold, is admin-
istrativelyappealing. It simplifies enforcement efforts by substantially 
decreasing the number of VAT returns the tax administration re· 
ceives.131 As the compliance costs associated with a VAT are low 
overall, but may be disproportionately high for many small businesses, 
a small business exemption also minimizes the impact that administra· 
6ve costs of the VAT may have on small business. Because small busi-
nesses exempt from the credit-invoice method VAT cannot claim 
input credits, and purchases from small businesses do not provide in-
121 Gendron, nOle 116, at 494. 
128 Schenk. note 113. at 438--39. 
129 Treas. Dep'I, note 56, at 55. 
130 Estimates for 2003 suggest that only I.S% of gross receipts in the Uniled Stales are 
collected by businesses with less than $100.000 in gross receipts. Kelly Luttrell, Patrice 
Treubcrt & Michael Parisi, Inlegrated Business Data, 2003, IRS Sta t. of Income BUll. 50 
fiS.B (Fall 2(06), available al hnp:J/www.irs.gov/taxstat.slarticleJU .. id=I64743.00.html. A 
gross re<:eipts exemption threshold o f approximately $100,000 would entail rela tively little 
revenue loss for the fisc See U.s. Gov't Accountability Office. Tax Policy: Value·Added 
Tax: Administrative Costs Vary with Complexity and Number of Businesses (May 3, 1993), 
available al htlp:flarchive.gao.gov/t2pba t6l149097.pdf. 
131 As of 2003, of the 27.5 million businesses in the United States, 21.4 million, or 77% , 
had gross receipts of less than $100,000. Luttrell et at . note 130, 8149·50, figs. A & B. 
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put credits, exempting small businesses generally does not provide a 
significant distortive advantage to those businesses. 
A small business exemption is problematic in an open subtraction-
method VAT, because purchases from exempt small businesses can 
still be deducted by registe red traders.132 Without an invoice require-
ment , a small business exemption creates the potential , among other 
abuses, for firms to avoid VAT liability on inputs by purchasing from 
businesses below the small business threshold , to convert nondeduct-
ible salary expenses into deductible service costs by housing the ir e m-
ployees in separate legal entities, and to avoid VAT co llection on sales 
by organizing their activities in a series of small enterprises. 133 A so-
phisticated subtraction-method VAT should avoid this problem by 
identifying and denying deductions for supplies from an exempt 
supplier. 
The Japanese example provides a cautionary note about the poten-
tial fo r deviations from the matching principle of closed systems with 
regards to small businesses in a subtraction-method VAT. The Japa-
nese VAT includes rules that allow registe red taxpayers to deduct in-
puts purchased from small businesses eligible for a "simplified 
system" of VAT taxation , even though the VAT is not truly assessed 
on the sa les of small businesses. Under the simplified system, these 
small businesses are allowed to pay a presumptive amount of VAT 
liabil ity, rather than VAT calculated based on actual sales and input 
tax paid.'l4 These rules favoring small domestic businesses had much 
broader application before 2004, when Japan lowered the threshold 
above which a business is no longer eligible for the simplified system 
for small businesses from taxable sa les of ¥200 million (approximately 
$2 million) per taxable year to taxable sa les of ¥50 million (approxi-
mately $500,000) per tax:able year.1lS In contrast to an ideal small bus-
iness exemption regime, the Japanese "simplified tax system" resulted 
in VAT input credits for purchases of goods on which full VAT may 
132 MiniZ. note 21. at 82. 
m See McLure, nole 24, al 122-23; Treas. Dep' t, note 56, at 26-28. Providing a small 
business exception creates some potential for firms to avoid VAT by organizing their activi-
ties in a series of small enterprises even in a credit-invoice method VAT. Anti-abuse rules 
that aggregate related firms for purposes of applying the VAT threshold therefore may be 
necessary. Some commentators suggest that these rules can be burdensome 10 enforce. 
Bankman & Schier, note 49, at 3. 
The pressure on these rules would be mueh more intense, however, without an invoice 
requirement, because the tax incentives to segregate aClivities so as to quali fy for exemp-
tion would be much greater. 
llot Businesses with annual taxable sales of less than Y 50 mill ion (approx 5500.000) can 
choose 10 calculate their VAT input credits by mUltiplying lax liability on sales by a fixed 
percentage delermincd based on a statulorily-prescribed busincss classification system. 
Japanese Ministry of Finance, nOle 39, at 178. 
m Id. 
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not have been assessed, and created a distortive advantage for small 
businesses eligible for the simplified tax system. 
The conclusions of a 2007 Japanese tax reform commission may also 
be instructive in considering the politics of adopting a sophisticated 
subtraction-method VAT. The commission concluded that "[t)he 
adoption of an 'invoice method ' [into the Japanese VAT] would be 
useful in increasing the appropriateness of an input tax credit, but at 
the same time it is feared that tax-exempt business operators might be 
kept out of the chain of transactions."136 The commission stated that 
reform efforts needed to "strike a balance between the need to im-
prove the reliability and transparency of the system and the need to 
care for the trading realities" of small businesses,137 The reform com-
mission's report suggests that the reason the Japanese maintain their 
current hybrid credit/subtraction method system, rather than fully 
adopting the credit-invoice method, is to allow other businesses de-
ductions for purchases from small Japanese businesses that remain in 
the simplified system of taxation and therefore are not fully subject to 
the VAT. 
I. Exports, Imports, and Border Tax Adjustments 
Every country in the OECD imposes a VAT on the destination ba-
sis with respect to cross-border transactions involving goods, although 
there is less consistency in the treatment of international trade in ser-
vices. !38 The choice between a destination-basis and an origin-basis 
VAT!39 has consequences for a substantial part of the economy, as 
gross exports represented 11% of U.S. GDP in 2008, while the value 
of gross imports was equal to 13.8% of GDP}40 Fully open subtrac-
tion-method VATs are imposed on an origin basis, while imposing a 
sophisticated subtraction-method VAT on a destination basis may be 
susceptible to challenge under World Trade Organization rules. 
136 Japanese Ta); Commission. nOle 43, al 28. 
Il7 Id. 
138 Schenk & Oldman, note 13, at 182-83. 
139 See notes 44-45 and accompanying le);l. A destination-basis VAT e);cludes exporlS 
from the 13); base and includes imports in the ta); base. Thus domestic consumption is 
ta);ed regardless of where Ihe goods being consumed are produced. An origin-basis tax 
includes exports in the la); base and e);cludes imports from the tax base. Thus, an origin-
basis tax is imposed on the entire value of goods and services produced domestically 
(whether sold at home or abroad), but taxes only the domestic markup to the value of 
imported goods and services. 
'40 Bureau of Econ. Analysis, note 105, tb1.1.1.10. 
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1. Diffi.culties of Origin-Basis Taxation 
An origin-basis VAT could be susceptible to significant tax avoid-
ance problems. Taxpaying businesses would be able to deduct 
purchases from foreign businesses that do not pay U.S. tax . Thus tax-
payers could claim deductions that would not be offset by correspond-
ing inclusions by other U.S. taxpayers. An origin-based VAT thus 
creates the same types of asymmetries that arise domestically in an 
open subtraction-method VAT. Because the asymmetry arises with 
respect to related foreign parties, rather than just nonregistered do-
mestic individuals, small businesses, and other tax nonregiste red e nti-
ties, the scope for tax avoidance may be much more severe, because 
the range o f entities that can act as counterparties for avoidance trans-
actio ns is broader, transactions may be easier to arrange, and e nforce-
ment of anti-abuse rules is likely to be more difficult. 
A related problem with an origin-basis consumption tax is its sus-
ceptibility to transfer pricing abuse, including with respect to royalty 
payments on intangible assets. ]4] Transfer pricing is also a major 
problem in enforcing the income tax . Nevertheless, there are some 
reasons to fear that transfer pricing problems would be even more 
severe under an origin-basis VAT than under the income tax. ]42 
Limiting the tax base to domestic consumption by imposing the 
VAT on a destination basis (taxing imports and excluding exports 
from tax) resolves these issues. '43 In a destination-basis sys tem the 
price established in cross-border transactions is irrelevant to the 
amount of revenue collected, because purchases from abroad do not 
provide a deduction and producing goods or services in the United 
States that are consumed abroad does not create taxable value added. 
141 See, e.g., Bradford, X-Tal(, nOle 4. at 17·18; Tal( Reform Panel Report , note ll , al 
169-70; sce note 50. and accompanying text, for a description of transfer pricing issues 
generally. 
142 Subpart F basc company rules act as a partial backslop to transfer pricing en force· 
ment when U.S. multina tionals allempl ]0 shift sales or services income 10 low·tal( jurisdic· 
tions. Under the curren] U.S. regime for tal( ing international income, taxation of foreign . 
source income of a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company generally is deferred until such 
time as that income is repatriated to the United States. In contrast, in an origin·basis VAT, 
obtaining foreign-source treatmenl for cash flow permanently exempts that cash now from 
U.S. tal(a tion. Thus. incentives 10 manipulate rules ]hat deem in which country a good or 
service is "produced" and transfer prices to minimize the value of "U.S .. produced " sales 
may be stronger under a VAT than current incentives to manipulate transfer prices and 
sourcing rules to lim it current year U.S. income tax liability. See genera lly Michael J. 
G raetz & Paul W. Oosterhuis, SUucturing an Exemption System for Foreign Income of 
U.S. Corporations, 54 Nat' l Tax J. 771 (2001). 
143 See, e.g. , Tax Refonn Pane! Report , note 11, a l 169. A destination·basis VAT does, 
however, face what David Bradford referred to as the " tourism problem," whereby indi-
viduals can reduce their laxes by consuming in low·tax jurisdictions. Bradford, X-Tax, note 
4. 
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For example, royalties paid for foreign-created intangible assets would 
not be deductible , since they are payments for imports, and royalties 
received from abroad would be exempt because they represent pay-
ments for exports of intangible assets. The 2005 Tax Reform Panel 
expressed a strong preference for a destination-basis consumption tax 
because of the serious enforcement difficulties raised by an origin-ba-
sis consumption tax,l44 
2. Imposing a VAT on a Destination. Basis 
Imposing the VAT on a destination basis requires a border adjust-
ment. To eliminate the tax paid on an exported good by businesses at 
earlier stages in the production and distribution process, exports are 
zero-rated, and as a result exporters receive a credit (and therefore 
perhaps a refund) for tax paid on their inputs under a credit-invoice 
method system, even though no tax is assessed on their sales. On the 
other hand, VAT is imposed at the border on imported goods. 14S Sub-
sequently, an importer may claim a credit against VAT liability (or 
refund) on their domestic sales. 
A fully open subtraction-method VAT will not include border ad-
justments, because it provides deductions for all inputs, including im-
ported inputs, and does not provide for zero-rating, In principle, a 
sophisticated subtraction-method VAT with one non-zero tax rate can 
be border-adjusted with exactly the same effect as a credit-invoice 
method VAT. Inputs associated with export sales are simply deducted 
even though export sales revenue is not included. Similarly, an im-
porting taxpayer is denied a deduction for imports on which VAT has 
not been assessed. Effectively administering border adjustments with-
out an explicit invoice requirement requires mechanisms that allow 
the tax administration to confirm that claimed exports were in fact 
exported, and that inputs claimed as subtraction-method deductions 
were in fact purcbased domestically from registered traders.146 As de-
scribed below, providing refunds to exporters is important to the eco-
nomic efficiency of a destination-basis VAT, but the possibility of 
improper claims makes these refunds a source of substantial risk for 
the fisc. 
144 Tax Reform Panel Repon , note 11 , at 167. 
1.5 In some instances, instead of imposing VAT at the border, EU VATs shift the liabil-
ity for the VAT from suppliers to purchasers of goods and services through a mechanism 
known as reverse charging. EU Vat Directive, nOle 55. 
1016 Sec, e .g. , Mintz, note 21, at 83. 
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3. World Trade Organization Rules and Border Tax Adjustments 
Border adjusting a subtraction-method VAT may elicit a challenge 
under WTO rules. Under those rules (as originally developed under 
the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), a border tax 
adjustment applied to a "direct" tax is a prohibited trade subsidy.147 
In contrast, WTO rules allow countries to border-adjust " indirect 
taxes." Further, WTO rules require that imported products be ac-
corded treatment no less favorable than like products of national ori-
gin. Lastly, WTO rules require that border adjustments for indirect 
taxes not exceed the tax levied on similar products sold in the domes-
tic market. 148 A subtraction-method VAT might be challenged as a 
direct tax under WTO rules. The imposition of a customs duty at the 
subtraction-method VAT rate on imports might be challenged as vio-
lating WTO rules. Finally, the border adjustment provided for ex-
ported goods under a subtraction-method VAT might be challenged as 
being excessive. 
The WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
defines direct taxes as "taxes on wages, profits ... and all other forms 
of income." 149 In contrast, indirect taxes are defined as "sales, excise, 
turnover, value added ... and all taxes other than direct taxes and 
import charges."'50 States do not assess sales tax on sales made by 
companies inside the ir borders to customers outside the state, but in-
come from these sales may be taxable under state corporate income 
taxes. Some observers suggest that the GAIT's distinction between 
direct and indirect taxes conforms to the definition of those te rms as 
they are used in U.S. domestic jurisprudence.l!i' In U.S. domestic law, 
an indirect tax is understood to be a tax that is imposed on goods, 
rather than income or the wealth of an entity.l!i2 
The 1970 GAIT Working Party on Border Tax Adjustment con-
cluded that a "fractioned collection" tax on value added (a credit-in-
voice method VAT) was equivalent to a retail sales tax levied directly 
on products, and thus was border-adjustable.l s3 The credit-invoice 
147 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 V.N.T.S. 194, art 1I1 '14. 
148 Agreemem on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Estabilshing the World Trade Organization, Annex I(g), Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1 (1994) [hereinafter ASCMJ. 
149 Id. at Annex I. n.58. 
ISO Id. 
151 First in Series on the Extraterriroriallncome Regime, Hearing before the Subcomm. 
on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Congo 14 (2002) 
(statement of Samuel Gibbons, Chairman, Gibbons and Company). 
151 See Zenith Radio Corp v. United States, 437 V.S. 443, 446 (1978) ("(AJn indirect tax 
lisJ a tax levied on the goods themselves, and computed as a percentage of the manufac_ 
turer's sales price rather than the income or wealth of the purchaser or seller."). 
III Working Party Rcporl, Border Tax AdjuslmehlS 'I 14, U3464 (Dcc. 2, 1970). 
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method VAT is thus WTO~cornpliant. Unlike a credit-invoice method 
VAT, a subtraction-method VAT may not formally be treated as a tax 
imposed on sales to consumers through fractioned collection. Rather, 
because it is entity-based and utilizes deductions rather than credits, 
the subtraction-method VAT, formalistically, could be challenged as 
more akin to a tax on corporate income or profits. The rebate pro-
vided for input credits associated with exports therefore might be 
deemed to be a trade subsidy. Furthermore, because the subtraction-
method VAT could be characterized as a tax on an entity, rather than 
a tax on products, collecting tax on imports at the border in the con-
lext of a subtraction-method VAT might be susceptible to challenge as 
a WTO·impermissible customs duty less favorable than that accorded 
products of domestic origin, in contrast to the in·lieu·of domestic taxa· 
tion portion of a credit·invoice method value·added tax. 
Finally, if the deductions for exported goods in a subtraction· 
method VAT were not adjusted to account for actual tax paid with 
respect to inputs, and if some inputs were exempted from tax or taxed 
at a lower rate, then the "rebate" provided by the deduction could 
exceed the VAT imposed with respect to the inputs on the export. 
GATTfWTO prohibits "exemption or remission, in respect of the pro· 
duction and distribution of exported products, of indirect taxes in ex-
cess of those levied in respect of the production and distribution of 
like products when sold for domestic consumption."154 [n this regard, 
some commentators speculated, prior to recent amendments to the 
Japanese VAT that limited the special treatment provided for small 
domestic business, that the Japanese VAT could be subject to a WTO 
challenge. They reasoned that while sales by small and medium-sized 
businesses were exempt from Japan's VAT, purchases from these busi-
nesses were still deductible in the hands of an exporter. 155 A sophisti-
cated subtraction-method VAT (with a single positive rate) would 
avoid susceptibility to challenge on this issue if it limited deductions to 
purchases from registered traders, just as the invoice-requirement 
does for credit-invoice method systems. The possibility of WTO chal-
lenge, however, might lead the United States to choose an origin-basis 
tax, or, in the alternative, could result in the imposition of WTO-per-
1S4 ASCM , nOle 148, al Annex I(g). 
lS5 See Shay & Summers, nOle 44, al 1049-53, 1053 n.100. Bul see nOles 120·21 and 
accompanying lext (discussing reforms to the Japanese consumption lax in 2004 Ihal sub-
stanlially reduced the scope of the special VAT Irealmenl for small business in Japan by 
limiling thaI Ireatment to small businesses with laxable sales of less than 1150 million (ap-
proximately $500,000) per taxable year). Note Ihal the language of the ASCM may be 
read to imply [hat Ihe question is whether remission of VAT on exports is in excess of VAT 
levied on the production and distribUlion of like products domeslically, and nOI simply 
whether treatmenl of exports is more favorable than domestic treatmenl of like products. 
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missible sanctions if the United States were to lose a WTO challenge. 
Either outcome would be highly undesirable. Selecting a credit-in-
voice method destination-basis tax avoids concerns about these issues. 
4. Refunds and "Losses" 
Negative taxable value added arises whenever taxed inputs exceed 
taxable supplies. Pure exporters generally have negative taxable 
value added, because exports are generally zero-rated. Similarly, 
other entities providing mostly zero-rated supplies, for example state 
and local governments, will have negative taxable value added, as may 
suppliers of specific goods or services subject to zero-rating. Other 
registered traders may also have negative value added. For example, 
any business whose investment in real assets is large relative to their 
current sales can have negative value added for a taxable period. 
Providing refunds or otherwise providing for prompt recovery of 
tax on negative valued added is important to the integrity of the 
VAT.156 Zero-rating is intended to provide input tax recovery in re-
spect of specific supplies, which may result in particular entities being 
due refunds. Failing to provide prompt input tax recovery converts 
the VAT, in part, from a tax on consumption to a tax on both con-
sumption and production. The economic efficiency arguments associ-
ated with implementing a VAT are thus greatly weakened to the 
extent refunds are not prompt. One way of conceptualizing the prob-
lem is that denying refunds for negative taxable value added is 
equivalent to allowing the tax to cascade (the most important effi-
ciency criticism with respect to a retail sales tax), at least for the pe-
riod the refund is denied. Failing to immediately refund tax on 
negative value added also increases the effective tax rate on risky ven-
tures, because firms will be taxed if they have positive value added, 
but denied refunds if they have negative taxable value added. 
The possibility of improper claims in open subtraction-method 
VATs makes immediate refundability of negative taxable value added 
a significant revenue risk. Without invoices to allow for audit and en-
sure offsetting tax revenue , the abuse potential implicit in being able 
to demand a check from the fisc by claiming to have negative taxable 
value added is great. 157 In other developed open economies, VAT re-
156 Sec, e.g., Boletin Oficial del Estado, Royal Decree 2126/2008 (2008) (Spain), availa-
ble at http://www.boe.eslboe/diasl2008l12127/pdfslA52074-52078.pdf (emphasizing the need 
to avoid deferring the payment of refunds, for example in the case of start-up enterprises 
and companies engaging in substantial capital investments). 
m Weisbach, note 25, at 617; see also Richard M. Bird, Review of Principles and Prac-
tice of Value Added Taxalion; Lessons for Developing Countries, 41 Can. Tax J. 1222, 
1223 (1993) (noting that a VAT is uniquely susceptible to fraud to the extent that a sup-
plier's invoice in effect constitutes a check drawn on the government). 
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funds often exceed 40% of gross VAT collections.15S The United 
States has a substantially lower ratio of exports to GOP than most 
DECO economies, so VAT refunds would be correspondingly lower 
in a U.S. VAT.1 59 Nevertheless. the general magnitude of VAT re~ 
funds relative to collections makes clear the fiscal risk that may be 
associated with providing immediate refunds. Although refund fraud 
exists in the credit-invoice method VAT, the invoice requirement em-
pirically has provided a reasonably adequate enforcement mechanism. 
Under EU rules, Member States generally may not require registered 
traders to carry forward excess credits for more than six months 
before providing refunds. l 60 
Refunds of negative taxable value added may be more controversial 
in a sublraction ~method VAT, particularly if using the subtraction~ 
method lens brings income tax system assumptions into play. The cor~ 
porate income tax allows losses to be carried back and carried for-
ward, to claim refunds for tax paid in prior years or to reduce tax 
liability in future years. 161 Such business losses are the closest income 
tax analog to negative taxable value added. Thus, it is possible that 
near-immediate refunds for negative taxable value added would be 
limited if the subtraction-method VAT was understood as a business 
tax. On the other hand, the Boren-Danforth and Gibbons proposals 
did provide for immediate refunds.162 
J . Coordinating Tax Administration. with the Rest of the World 
In addition to being border-adjustable, credit-invoice method VATs 
may be more likely to be imposed in a manner that avoids double 
taxation and double non taxation of cross-border services than sub-
traction-method VATs. One key issue in designing a VAT for the 21st 
century relates to the rules for taxation of cross-border trade in ser-
ISS Graham Harrison & Russell Krelove, VAT Refunds: A Review of Country Experi-
ence 5, 8 (IMF. Working Paper No. OSn18. 2005), avai lable at httpJ/imf.org.externaVpubs! 
ftlwpl2OO5JwpOS218.pdf. Over the four-year period from 1998 to 2001 , VAT refunds in 
canada averaged 50.3% of gross VAT collections. while VAT refunds in the EU averaged 
38.1 % of collections. Id. at 8; see Michael Keen & Stephen Smith, VAT Fraud aDd Eva-
sion: What Do We Know, and What Can be Done?, S9 Nat'l Tall. J . 861 (2006). 
IS9 Keen & Smith, note 158, at 884. 
18) Council Directive 79110721EEC, arl. 7(4), 1979 O.J. (L 331) II . (EC). 
161 Net operating losses generally can be carried back for two years or carried forward 
for twenty years. IRC § In. Many limitat ions and special rules apply, including rules 
limiting or disallowing the carryover of net operating losses when stock ownership in a 
corporation shifts in specified ways. IRC §§ 381-384. 
162 H.R. 4050, note 34, at § 202; Danforth & Boren, nOle 33 ("Refunds of BAT (e.g .. a 
refund may be due because a taxpayer has business purchases for the taxable period in 
excess of gross receipts for the period) would be made by tbe Secretary of the Treasury 
within 45 days of the taxpayer fil ing a return requesting the refund."). 
2010J WHERE CREDIT IS DUE 351 
vices and intangibles}63 U.S. exports of financial services, insurance 
services, education, te lecommunications, and professional and techni-
cal services grew at an average rate of 9.9% per year between 1992 
and 2005.164 Cross-border royalty and license fees for intangibles 
grew at a rate of 8.1 % over the same period.16 5 
The OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs is currently developing 
VAT/GST guidelines in the area of intemationaUy traded services and 
intangibles, with the twin goals of ensuring that taxation aligns as 
closely as possible with consumption of these services and intangibles 
(that is, value added is taxed on a destination basis) and that interna-
tional norms develop on a consensus basis so as to avoid both double 
taxation and unintended nontaxation .l66 In the income tax area, bilat-
eral tax treaties allocate taxing rights between jurisdictions and in-
clude other provisions that reduce the risk of double taxation. This 
bilateral treaty system, however, does not generally extend to the area 
of VAT/GST. Thus, if the United States were to adopt a VAT, it 
would be important to coordinate our domestic rules for addressing 
the application of VAT/GST with those of the most significant recipi-
ents of services and intangibles supplied from the United States, and 
providers of services and intangibles to the United States, in order to 
avoid double taxation and non taxation with respect to cross-border 
services.167 Without such coordination, the application of destination-
basis principles can be inconsistent and lead to double taxation or 
double non taxation. 
The guidelines emerging from the DEeD, however, will be prima-
rily intended to inform the administration of a credit-invoice method 
163 See Walter Helierstein & Michael Keen, Interjurisdictionallssues in the Design of a 
VAT. 63 Tax L. Rev. 359 (2010). 
1M Maria Borga, Improved Measures of U.S. Internat ional Services: The Cases of Insur-
ance, Wholesale and Retail Trade. and Financial Services. in International Trade in Ser-
vices and Intangibles in the Era of Globalization 79 (Marshall Reinsdorf & Matthew 
Slaughter eds., 2009). 
16.5 Id. 
!66 Comm. on Fiscal Affairs, DECO, Applying VATIGST to Cross-Border Trade in Ser-
vices and Intangibles: Emerging Concepts for Defining Place of Taxation-Invitation for 
Comments 4-5 (2008), available at hnp:llwww.oecd.orgldataoecdJ42111139874228.pdf. 
161 Centre for Tax Pol'y and Admin., OECD, The Application of Consumption Taxes to 
the Trade in International Services and Intangibles 6 (2004), available at http://www.Qe(:d. 
orgidataoecdl56136J32997184.pdf. There is currently no widely available mechanism to set-
tle international double consumption tax disputes. Thcre are, however, some refund mech-
anisms under certain countries' domestic law for VAT/GST incurred by foreign business 
(or registration procedures in certain countries to achieve the same eUect), which address 
some issues of double consumption taxation. Jd. al 7. While in principle it would be possi-
ble to extend the existing bilateral tax treaty network to cover such taxes, as a practical 
matter, such a development seems highly unlikely. Victor Thuryoni, International Tax Co-
operation and a Multilateral Treaty, 26 Brook. J. Int' I L. t641 (2001) (proposing a multilat-
eral treaty system to replace the OECD bilateral model). 
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VAT, for the simple reason that most OEeD member states have such 
a VAT. To be sure, this advice could be adapted to a subtraction-
method VAT, but the relevance of the guidelines may be less appar-
ent, and the likelihood of adopting their recommendations with ease 
consequently may be lower. Today. in fact, a lack of continuity be-
tween EU and Japanese rules regarding the place of taxation of traded 
services and intangibles can lead to significant double taxation and 
double nontaxation.l68 Cross-border services and intangibles thus 
provide an example of where the advantages of conformity with the 
international norm of a credit-invoice VAT makes a credit-invoice 
method VAT more attractive than a subtraction-method VAT. 
K. Coordinating the VAT with State Retail Sales Taxes 
Domestically, coordinating the VAT with state sales taxes is likely 
to pose significant challenges. Federal adoption of a credit-invoice 
method VAT as opposed to a subtraction-method VAT may result in 
different responses from the states with respect to their existing retail 
sales taxes. In another paper for this conference, Charles McLure 
suggests that one ideaJ solution for adopting an add-on VAT in the 
United States would involve a set of state retail sales taxes that con-
form to the federal VAT, both with respect to the treatment of sup-
plies to business and with respect to the set of goods and services that 
are taxed.169 McLure suggests that all services taxed under the VAT 
should also be taxed under state RSTs, and tbat , with caveats not de-
scribed here, VAT-registered traders could be treated as exempt from 
RST as a result of having registered to pay VAT.170 He argues that it 
would ease compliance substantially if only the goods and services 
benefiting from exemptions and zero-rating under the federal VAT 
were exempt under state RSTs.171 No less importantly, he notes that 
to make compliance manageable, any goods and services benefiting 
168 Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Taxing Services Under the EU VAT and Japanese 
Consumption Tax: A Comparative Assessment of New EU Place of Taxation Rules for 
Services and Intangibles 28-33 (Boston Univ. Sch . of Law, Working Paper No. 06-30, 
2006), available at hllp:I!www.bu.eduJIaw/faculty/scholarshiplworkingpapersldocumentsl 
AinswonhR091206.pdf. 
WI McLure, note 58. McLure recommends that the states adopt a "zero-rale VIVAT" 
(which is equivalent to comprehensive reverse charging) that can be seen as an ideal form 
of RST that could be easily coordinated with the federal VAT. Id. at 673. 
170 Td. at 681. 
J1l ld. at 704. McLUre notes that in addit ion 10 the lack of uniformity of tax bases, the 
absence of uniform administrative procedures across states and the lack of administrative 
cooperation among states a re the chief causes of complexity of the sales tax system as it is 
experienced by businesses operating in more tban one stale. Charles E. McLure, Jr., Coor-
dinating Slate Sales Taxes with a Federal VAT: Opportunities, Risks, and Challenges, 117 
St. Tax Today 2 (June 20, 2005). 
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from exemption or zero-rating should be defined in a standard way for 
both VAT and RST purposes.l 72 
Whether this ideal level of coordination between federal and state 
tax administrations is given consideration could be affected by the na-
ture of the VAT adopted at the federal level. In the open subtraction-
method VAT, there is no VAT registration of the type on which 
McLure hopes to rely, and thus no prospect for conformity with re-
spect to the treatment of sales of intermediate inputs to other busi-
nesses. More generally, advocates of a subtraction-method VAT 
believe that one reason to adopt such a tax is that, unlike the credit-
invoice method VAT, it is a "business tax" and not a "transactions-
based" tax, and therefore does not intrude on a space (transactions-
based consumption taxes) historically occupied by state and local gov-
ernment. 173 This perception may be a political advantage of the sub-
traction-method VAT. Migration towards a uniform VAT/RST base, 
however, seems significantly less likely if the federal government 
adopts any form of subtraction-method VAT, precisely because such a 
tax has little outward resemblance to retail sales taxes, and therefore 
the question of base conformity is unlikely to arise. As McLure notes, 
although it would be a challenge to convince the states to conform to a 
federal VAT base, any reasonably broad VAT base would be a signifi-
cant improvement for most state sales taxes.l74 Analysts generally 
agree that if such a base were adopted on a revenue-neutral basis by 
state RSTs, it would be of benefit to the states and taxpayers alike.l15 
L. The Political Economy of Adoption and Amendment 
Advocates of subtraction-method VATs claim that a political and 
practical advantage of the subtraction method of calculation is its rela-
tive familiarity.l76 At first glance, the major differences between an 
172 McLure, note 58, at 704. 
173 Alan Schenk, Choosing the Form of a Federal VAT, 22 Cap. u. L. Rev 291, 309 
(199]) (noting that opposition to a Cederal credit-invoice method VAT may intensify be-
cause state governments view it as an intrusion into the field of sales tax, whereas slates 
may not raise a serious objection to a federal subtraction-method VAT because it is "bur-
ied in the sales price of taxable goods and services because buyers do nOf see the fax on 
every taxable purchase. "). 
174 McLure, nOle 171 , at 919; Charles E. McLure, Jr. , The Nuttiness of State and Local 
Taxes and the Nuttiness of Responses Thereto, 2S SI. Tax Notes 841 (Sept. 16,2(02) (here-
inafter Nuttiness]. 
m McLure, Nuttiness, note 174, at 844-48 (describing the ideal, economically neutral 
sales tax base); John L Mikesell, Sales Tax Incentives for Economic Development: Why 
Shouldn 't Production Exemptions Be General?, 54 Nat'l Tax. J. 557 (2001); Graetz, note 
18, at 189-91 (suggesting that coordination between state and federal consumption tax ba-
ses would have great economic benefits). 
116 Hufbauer & Grieco, nole 20, at 70-71 (listing four such considerations making sub-
traction method superior to credit method); see also Tax Reform Panel Report, note II , at 
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open subtraction·method consumption tax and a corporate income tax 
are expensing and the loss of interest deductions. These are major 
divergences from the corporate income tax, but for legislative pur-
poses these changes may seem small relative to the perceived sea-
change of imposing a federal tax at the cash register. 
One potential consequence of the claim that a subtraction-method 
VAT is a "business tax" rather than a transactional tax imposed on 
sales to consumers could be that the rules governing an add-on sub-
traction-method VAT and a corporate income tax may come to be 
seen as fungible, and the two taxes may be allowed to blur and inter-
act in unexpected ways. For example, businesses that have negative 
income but continue to have positive VAT liability (because sales ex-
ceed nonlabor input costs) might lobby to amend or repeal a subtrac-
tion-method VAT. Positive VAT liability for the auto industry at a 
time it was experiencing significant losses led to the repeal of Michi -
gan 's Single Business Tax, a state-level, value-added tax that was 
structured as an accounts-based, entity-level tax .D7 Alte rnately, some 
analysts suggest that the VAT might be vulnerable to a political com-
promise that allows capital investments to be expensed (as in a VAT) 
while providing deductions for interest expense (as in the corporate 
income tax), resulting in negative marginal effective tax rates.l7s Or, 
to raise revenue, expensing might be repealed and replaced with a 
depreciation system, as effectively happened over time with the Mich-
163 (the proposed plan "would be implemented using the subtraction method because it is 
closer to current law methods of accouDting, which would reduce the cOSts of switching tax 
systems"). That claim is somewhat overstated, since every multina tional corporation 
should have experience with the credit-invoice method VAT in its operations outside the 
United States. Nevertheless, most U.S. businesses are not multinat ionals. 
In Dave Turzewski & Mike Deal, The Impact of the New Michigan Business Tax on the 
Auto Industry, 50 51. Tax Notes 145 (Dec. 15,2(08). Michigan's Single Business Tax (SBT) 
was a state-level "addition-method " modified value-added tax. Sec generally House Fiscal 
Agency, House of Representatives, State of Michigan, Background and History: Michi-
gan's Single Business Tax (2003). The SST was perceived as a business-level tax since the 
accou nts-based formula for calcu la ting liability relied on deductions and addi tions to a 
"business income" concepl. See id. a t 13-14 (discussing the role of "business income" in 
the tax base). The SBT was in place from 1975 until its repeal, effective December 31, 
2001. See Mich. Compo Laws § 208.1101(1) (repealing the single business tax). It had been 
amended various times, and the Michigan legislature added various deductions, exemp-
tions. and credits that moved the tax away from a theoretically pure consumption tax base. 
$ce, e.g .. Mich. Camp. Laws § 208.35a (the repealed investmentta" credit). The SBT "was 
ultimately viewed as a burdensome tax on businesses that had large payroll expenses and 
significant capital investment." Turzewski & Deal, supra, a t 145. 
118 Ronald A. Pearlman, A Tax Reform Caveat: In the Real World, There Is No Perfect 
Tax System, in Toward Fundamental Tax Refonn 119 (Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Has-
sell cds., 2005) (expressing the author's fear of an "inevitable" political compromise like 
"enactment of enhanced tax-sheltered savings incentives or expensing of capilal invest-
ments without any further limitat ions on the deductibility of interest expense"). 
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igan Single Business Tax.l19 Even if initially adopted In a relatively 
"clean" form, the very familiarity of the subtraction-method VAT 
would seem to leave it vulnerable to adornment with various features 
familiar from the current corporate income tax} 80 The credit-invoice 
method VAT would certainly be subject to its own political pressures , 
with regard to prefe rential rates, exemptions, zero-rating, and the like. 
However, the corporate income tax lens would not seem to have sali-
ence in debates over a credit-invoice method VAT. Meanwhile, the 
basic integrity of the credit-invoice method VAT is retained even in 
the face of some exemptions and zero-eating. l S I 
IV. AN ALTERNATJVE FRAMEWORK PREMISED ON 
INFORMATION COLLECTION 
As alluded to early in this Article, Weisbach has elegantly demon-
strated that purported substantive differences between the subtrac-
tion-method VAT and the credit-invoice method VAT are not 
inherent to the two methods of calculation.lS2 Weisbach points out 
that with the same information collection and other parallel design 
decisions, a subtraction-method VAT could, in principle , be fashioned 
to produce identical results to a credit-invoice method VAT.tS3 He 
argues that the differences, such as the ability to deq.uct the cost of 
inputs purchased from nontaxpayers or the flexibility to impose pref-
erential tax rates on specific goods or se rvices, are based on the 
amount of information that analysts assume will be collected in a 
credit-invoice method VAT and a subtraction-method VAT respec-
tively.l84 In his words, "anything that can be achieved through a 
credit system can be achieved through a deduction system with the 
right information." 18S 
The virtue of Weisbach's analytical framework, which differentiates 
between open and closed VAT systems, is that it emphasizes the dis-
tinction be tween the information gathered in a credit-invoice or sub-
traction method system, the design decisions made in implementing 
179 Thrzewski & Deal, nOle 177. 
180 See, e.g., J. CliflOn Aeming, Jr. , Scoping Out the Uncenain Simplification (Compli-
cat ion?) Effects of VATs, BATs, and Consumed Income Taxes, 2 Aa. Tax Rev. 390,410-11 
(1995) (listing ten "complex lax incentive provisions presently found in the income tax" 
that would likely "adom" a BAT); Pearlman. note 178, at 119. 
lSI Graetz, note 18, at 82 ("the best alternative (of consumption lax] is the credit·invoice 
VAT"). 
182 Weisbach, nOle 15, at 214-15 (showing how " (g]iven the information provided in a 
credit-invoice VAT. a subtraction method VAT could be made identical"). 
183 Id. at 215. 
1&4 Id. 
185 Id. at 219. 
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that system, and the mechanics of calculating tax liability. If one takes 
the only difference between a credit-invoice method VAT and a sub-
traction-method VAT to be that one uses credits and the other uses 
deductions , then it should be possible to mathematically convert be-
tween the two systems_ 
Weisbach illustrated that the credit-invoice method of calculation 
and the subtraction method of calculation can be used to produce the 
same policy result as part of an argument that a progressive two-tier 
consumption tax could be a workable tax reform proposal, which 
would combine the subtraction method of calculation with the invoice 
features and certain other design elements of a credit-invoice method 
VATYl6 This unique combination of features was in fact largely 
adopted by the 2005 Tax Reform Panel. ]87 
But unless the goal is a progressive consumption tax , or implement-
ing some other substantive deviation from standard credit-invoice 
method VAT design , there is no clear impetus for combining a sub-
traction-method of calculation with the invoice requirement and other 
standard design features of the credit-invoice method VAT. Particu-
larly in the presence of multiple rates, such a system results in tax 
calculations that are less intuitive than the credit-invoice method, and 
cannot be described as simpler to calculate, or more familiar to U.s. 
businesses than the credit-invoice mechanism. 
A recent proposal from Gary Hufbauer and Paul Grieco to adopt a 
subtraction-method VAT with information collection features similar 
to an invoice requirement illustrates that the rationale for using a sub-
traction-method VAT tends to be to maintain an entity-based ap-
proach that justifies deviations from typical VAT design. ]SS Unlike 
most subtraction-method VAT proposals for the United States, Huf-
bauer and Grieco propose a sophisticated subtraction-method VAT.I 89 
However, while Hufbauer and Grieco would limit the availability of 
deductions to purchases from registered taxpayers, they would then 
(jrnit the application of their subtraction-method VAT to corporations 
currently subject to the corporate income tax , and exempt all other 
businesses. ]90 As discussed above, businesses that make exempt sup-
plies have an incentive to avoid paying VAT.191 The widespread ex-
emption for flow-through businesses across all sectors of the U.S. 
economy entailed by Hufbauer and Grieco's proposal therefore un-
dermines the self-policing nature of the VAT. 
186 See id. 
187 TaX" Reform Panel Report , nOle 11, at 163. 
188 Hufbauer & Grieco, nole 20; see text accompanying nOles 32, 69. 
189 Hufbauer & Grieco, note 20, at 70-74. 
19(1 Id. 
191 See Section III.B. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Credit-invoice method VATs and subtraction-method VATs are, at 
a conceptual level, very similar taxes. The subtraction method aggre-
gates all taxable receipts into an account, subtracts deductible ex-
penses, and then multiplies by a tax rate. In contrast, the credit-
invoice method starts with taxable amounts imposed on individual 
transactions, but businesses must ultimately aggregate transactions 
into accounts to file returns. Nevertheless, as a result of the different 
starling points, the subtraction-method VAT is perceived to be a tax 
on an entity, while the credit-invoice method VAT is perceived to be a 
tax on specific goods and services. The most important substantive 
difference between the credit-invoice method VAT and the subtrac-
tion-method VAT lies in the invoice requirement. The invoice re-
quirement performs two basic functions: It limits the ability of a 
registered trader to reduce its VAT burden by an offset for the cost of 
its business inputs to an offset for business inputs purchased from 
other registered traders, and it ensures that offset is exactly equal to 
the amount of VAT paid. By ensuring symmetry between deductions 
and inclusions, the invoice requirement substantially reduces tax 
avoidance opportunities in the VAT. The invoice requirement also 
allows exemptions and zero-rating to work properly and makes WTO-
compliant border adjustments possible. Together, these features are 
essential if the VAT is to be an efficient tool for revenue collection 
while remaining consistent with the United States' international trade 
obligations. 
Subtraction-method VATs can be divided into open subtraction-
method VATs and sophisticated subtraction-method VATs. Subtrac-
tion-method VAT proposals introduced in the U.S. Congress generally 
have been open domestically. Open subtraction-method VATs are 
flawed. They are vulnerable to tax avoidance , invite widespread lob-
bying for exemptions, and probably cannot be administered on a des-
tination basis and remain WTO-compliant. A sophisticated 
subtraction-method VAT imposed at a single nonzero rate could ad-
dress these issues by limiting deductions to inputs purchased from reg-
istered taxpayers. In this case, the credit-invoice method VAT and the 
subtraction-method VAT could produce identical results. To do so, 
however, the sophisticated subtraction-method VAT must abandon 
the calculation of VAT liability based on simpler summary accounts, 
which is a primary reason cited by subtraction-method VAT advocates 
for preferring the subtraction method. 
Furthermore, the perceived difference between the subtraction-
method VAT, as an "accounts-based" tax on an entity, and the credit-
invoice method VAT, as a "transactions-based" tax on specific goods 
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and services, could affect policy outcomes. For instance, the "entity 
tax" characterization of a subtraction-method VAT may make it less 
likely to be imposed at multiple rates. Multiple rates are generally 
undesirable. A subtraction-method VAT, however, may also be more 
likely to be enacted with less desirable entity-based exemptions, in-
cluding for nonprofit and governmental entities, or even for all pass-
through entities, and with broad rather than narrowly tailored exemp-
tions in areas such as residential housing and financial services. Ap-
propriate treatment of these sectors is an important part of designing 
a VAT, as together they represent a substantial part of economic ac-
tivity. Further, as an entity-based tax, even a sophisticated subtrac-
tion-method VAT may be vulnerable to WTO challenge if imposed on 
a destination basis. Avoiding double taxation and non taxation in the 
area of cross-border services through international cooperation may 
also be more likely in a credit-invoice method VAT than in a subtrac-
tion-method VAT. Similarly, the potential for coordination with state 
sales taxes may be higher under a credit-invoice method VAT. Fi-
nally, a credit-invoice method VAT alongside the corporate income 
tax seems less vulnerable to amendment to include features of the cor-
porate income tax than a subtraction-method VAT. Credit-invoice 
method VATs thus seem, on balance, more likely than subtraction-
method VATs to be adopted with VAT design best practices. This is 
perhaps unsurprising, as those practices were developed based on fifty 
years of worldwide experience with credit-invoice method VATs. As 
one author at this conference has written previously, if a VAT were to 
be adopted to supplement or partially replace the income tax, it is not 
clear why it would be desirable to try to "reinvent the wheel."l92 
1':12 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Comment on Shay and Summers: Selected International As-
pects of Fundamental Tax Reform Proposals, 51 U. Miami. L Rev. 1085, 1086 (1997). 
